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Book Review

Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner
and Legal Pragmatism
Michael Sullivan† and Daniel J. Solove††
Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy. By Richard A. Posner. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2003. Pp. 398. $35.00.
INTRODUCTION
“[P]ragmatist theory of law is, like much pragmatist theory, essentially
banal.”1 So wrote Thomas Grey at the dawn of pragmatism’s renaissance in
legal theory.2 Even Richard Rorty, the philosopher frequently credited with
reviving pragmatism more generally, concurs.3 For Grey and Rorty,
pragmatism is banal because it “is the implicit working theory of most good
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†† Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, George
Washington University Law School (Fall 2003). J.D., Yale Law School.
Professor Sullivan would like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Todd Brown, Shawn Collins, John
Lysaker, John Lachs, Terry McInnis, Michael Perry, Robert Schapiro, John Stuhr, Steven Strange,
and Cynthia Willett for many helpful suggestions, criticisms, and comments. Professor Solove
would like to thank Linda Fisher, Jim Freeman, Rachel Godsil, and Paul Schwartz for helpful
comments on the manuscript.
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School.
1. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 814 (1989).
2. The early 1990s witnessed a marked increase in legal academics’ interest in pragmatism.
See, e.g., Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1569 (1990); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996).
3. See Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM
IN LAW AND SOCIETY 89, 89 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) (“I think it is true that
by now pragmatism is banal in its application to law.”).
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lawyers.”4 As Rorty writes, “Pragmatism was reasonably shocking seventy
years ago, but in the ensuing decades it has gradually been absorbed into
American common sense.”5
Richard Posner could not agree more. For well over a decade, Posner
has been the leading proponent of legal pragmatism. His latest book, Law,
Pragmatism, and Democracy, is the most comprehensive account to date of
his pragmatic vision of the law and democracy. Posner proclaims that
“pragmatism is the best description of the American judicial ethos and also
the best guide to the improvement of judicial performance—and thus the
best normative as well as positive theory of the judicial role.”6 For Posner,
pragmatic adjudication boils down to “reasonableness”;7 it is “[n]ebulous
and banal, modest and perhaps even timorous—or maybe oscillating
unpredictably between timorous and bold.”8
Pragmatism could not ask for a more influential spokesperson. As
Ronald Dworkin has noted, “Richard Posner is the wonder of the legal
world.”9 Not only has he been the chief judge of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, but he is also one of the most prolific and frequently cited legal
scholars of our age.10 Thus, Posner naturally occupies a position at the
forefront of legal debates, and he has rapidly become the steward of
pragmatism in the law.
A distinctly American brand of philosophy, pragmatism emerged at the
turn of the twentieth century from thinkers such as Charles Peirce, William
James, and John Dewey. Although they differed in many respects, classical
pragmatists generally viewed philosophy as a tool to grapple with life’s
problems.11 Pragmatists assessed the success of a philosophy not in terms of
4. Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1590 (1990); see also Rorty, supra note 3, at 89 (quoting Grey).
5. Rorty, supra note 3, at 90.
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1 (2003).
7. Id. at 59.
8. Id. at 73.
9. Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy and Monica Lewinsky, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 9, 2000, at
48, 48.
10. A recent study undertaken by Fred Shapiro, Associate Librarian for Public Services and
Lecturer in Legal Research at Yale Law School, has discovered that Posner is the most cited
contemporary author of nontreatise legal books and articles. As of 1999, Posner had 7981
citations, while the next-most-cited author, Ronald Dworkin, had 4488. Published but Not
Perished, AM. LAW., Dec. 1999, at 107, 107.
11. Pragmatists like Dewey are careful not to insist on necessary and sufficient conditions for
calling something a pragmatic theory. Calls to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
pragmatism risk converting it into the very positions it seeks to repudiate. In Dewey’s view, it is
“better to view pragmatism quite vaguely as part and parcel of a general movement of intellectual
reconstruction.” JOHN DEWEY, THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS
IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT, at iv (1910), reprinted in 17 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS,
1925-1953, at 39, 40 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1981). Otherwise, one would have to define
pragmatism “in terms of the very past systems against which it is a reaction” or “regard it as a
fixed rival system making like claim to completeness and finality.” Id., reprinted in 17 JOHN
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra, at 40. This is problematic since “one of the
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its correspondence to ultimate eternal truths, but based upon its usefulness
as a practical tool to yield better, more satisfying experiences.
Following the classical pragmatists, Posner’s account of pragmatism
rejects philosophy as a method for securing unshakeable foundations for
knowledge. Pragmatism, according to Posner, rejects the agenda for
philosophy beginning with Plato, which is “the task of discovering by
speculative reasoning the truths that would provide secure foundations for
scientific knowledge and moral, political, and aesthetic beliefs.”12
Pragmatists recognize that knowledge is “local” and “perspectival” and is
“shaped by the historical and other conditions in which it is produced.”13
Posner’s pragmatism also evaluates proposals “by the criterion of what
works,” seeking “to judge issues on the basis of their concrete
consequences for a person’s happiness and prosperity.”14
Yet beyond sharing these basic positions, Posner parts ways with the
classical pragmatists. Posner concludes that he has “found little in classical
American pragmatism or in either the orthodox or the recusant versions of
modern pragmatic philosophy that law can use.”15 Therefore, Posner
introduces what he calls “everyday pragmatism,” which he contends “has
much to contribute to law.”16 Everyday pragmatism is a “pragmatic
mood,”17 in which “[t]he everyday pragmatist uses common sense to
resolve problems.”18 As Posner understands it, pragmatism is a form of
antifoundationalism that rejects formalism. In his book Overcoming Law,
Posner writes that
[a]ll that a pragmatic jurisprudence really connotes—and it
connoted it in 1897 or 1921 as much as it does today—is a rejection
of the idea that law is something grounded in permanent principles
and realized in logical manipulations of those principles, and a
determination to use law as an instrument for social ends.19
On this account, pragmatism is a relatively commonplace set of ideas
and should hardly be shocking to the contemporary mind. Heavily
influenced by pragmatism, legal realism largely succeeded in dispelling
the formalist vision of the law as resting upon fixed and immutable

marked traits of the pragmatic movement is just the surrender of every such claim.” Id., reprinted
in 17 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra, at 40.
12. POSNER, supra note 6, at 29-30.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 50.
15. Id. at 49.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 52.
19. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 405 (1995).
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principles.20 Brian Leiter sums it up: “[A]s the cliché has it . . . ‘we are all
[legal] realists now . . . .’”21 Although pragmatism shares legal realism’s
antifoundationalism, pragmatism differs from realism, Posner argues,
because it “lacks the political commitments of the realists and the crits.”22
Rather, “pragmatism is more a tradition, attitude, and outlook than a body
of doctrine”; it is more of a mood than a substantive philosophy.23 Posner
insists that pragmatism has “no inherent political valence.”24
Building upon his account of pragmatism, Posner goes on to discuss
democracy. He rejects models of deliberative democracy that emphasize
encouraging citizens to become involved in political life and engaged in
discourse about the issues of the day. According to Posner, deliberative
democracy, which he terms “Concept 1 democracy,” is unrealistic because
people will never display the civic-mindedness and interest necessary to
engage in fruitful political discourse.25 In contrast, he embraces the theory
of democracy advanced by Joseph Schumpeter, which he terms “Concept 2
democracy,” where elite leaders represent the people, who in turn remain
largely disengaged from political life and function only as a check on
egregious abuses of power.26 According to Posner, Concept 2 democracy
should be preferred to Concept 1 democracy on pragmatic grounds.
For the most part, Posner’s theory of pragmatism has been attacked
externally, mainly by theorists unsympathetic to pragmatism, such as
Ronald Dworkin, David Luban, and many others.27 While these critics
staunchly disagree with his policy conclusions, and some criticize his
account of pragmatism as overly vague or unclear,28 Posner’s theory
20. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 972-75 (1999).
21. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 267, 267 (1997).
22. POSNER, supra note 6, at 84.
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id. at 84.
25. Id. at 135.
26. Id. at 158-78.
27. E.g., Lynn A. Baker, “Just Do It”: Pragmatism and Progressive Social Change, 78 VA.
L. REV. 697 (1992), reprinted in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 99; Ronald
Dworkin, Darwin’s New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998); David Luban, What’s
Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1996); Steven D. Smith, The
Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The
Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 535.
28. Although not discussing pragmatism in depth, Jeffrey Rosen does acknowledge that
“Posner’s pragmatism is not very pragmatic.” Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 YALE L.J.
581, 601 (1995) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 19). Numerous commentators have criticized
Posner for being vague about what he means by pragmatism. See, e.g., Brian E. Butler, Posner’s
Problem with Moral Philosophy, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 325, 341-42 (2000) (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)) (“Posner’s
invocation of the pragmatist is unhelpful because his description of the pragmatic judge’s
aim . . . is so bland as to be almost universally beyond reproach.”); Frank S. Ravitch, Can an Old
Dog Learn New Tricks? A Nonfoundationalist Analysis of Richard Posner’s The Problematics of
Moral and Legal Theory, 37 TULSA L. REV. 967, 980 (2002) (reviewing POSNER, supra) (“What
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remains largely unchallenged from within the pragmatic tradition. In this
Review, we part company with those critics of Posner who attack his views
from a philosophical position external to pragmatism. Instead, we contest
Posner’s account of pragmatism—and its relationship to elitist
democracy—from within the pragmatic tradition. We contend that Posner’s
views are problematic not because they are pragmatic, but because they are
often not pragmatic enough.
In Part I, we put Posner’s account to the pragmatic test by examining its
implications. We argue that Posner’s pragmatism offers little help when it
comes to evaluating and selecting ends, which is crucial for resolving legal
and policy disputes. We suggest that this failure results from Posner’s
attempt to excise pragmatism’s theoretical dimension. In Posner’s hands,
pragmatism stands for hard-nosed “common sense” and “reasonableness,”
rejecting what he views as pie-in-the-sky abstract theories of reform. But
what passes for legal pragmatism in this “revival” and “renaissance” is
often a brand of commonplace reasoning that is more complacent than
critical. Many neopragmatists are little more than realists who aim to
account for current problems descriptively and empirically. Such accounts
of pragmatism provide convenient straw men for critics to attack, while at
the same time privileging entrenched institutions and the status quo.
In contrast, we return to the thought of the classical pragmatists to offer
an alternative vision of pragmatism built primarily upon the ideas of John
Dewey.29 This account better integrates theory and practice and provides
more meaningful guidance about the choice of ends. We contend that
although Posner adopts many of the ideas of the classical pragmatists, he
diverges in crucial ways that lead him to have internal inconsistencies with
his own pragmatic commitments and to end up employing forms of
reasoning against which the pragmatists strongly cautioned. Posner finds
himself in this position because the pragmatic ideas upon which he founds
his theory have far more potent and revolutionary implications than Posner
is willing to entertain. Posner begins on the pragmatic path, but he will not
commit to it fully, perhaps because pragmatism is anything but banal.
When seen in its full colors rather than faded Posnerian pastels, pragmatism
is Legal Pragmatism according to Posner? After reading the book I still do not have a clear answer
beyond vague calls for reaching the ‘best answer,’ considering consequences, and making things
better.”); Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 597, 600 (2000) (reviewing
POSNER, supra) (“Finally, Posner’s writing—like that of almost all self-styled pragmatists—turns
slippery and evasive (by analytical standards) when the time comes to explain what ‘pragmatism’
amounts to.”).
29. Although typically self-styled pragmatists view their thought self-consciously in
relationship to the work of James and Dewey, some contemporary pragmatists, such as Jules
Coleman, locate the source of their indebtedness in other thinkers. Coleman draws upon later
accounts of pragmatism developed in the works of authors such as Wilfrid Sellars, W.V.O. Quine,
Donald Davidson, and Hilary Putnam. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN
DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 6 n.6 (2001).
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is radical. Its ideas unsettle many of the institutions and “realities” that
Posner takes as given.
In Part II, we turn to Posner’s theory of democracy. Surprisingly, in
light of Posner’s insistence that pragmatism has no political valence, Posner
attempts to use pragmatism to reach his conclusion that Concept 2
democracy is normatively superior to Concept 1 democracy, a conclusion
with deep political valences. We demonstrate that Posner’s justification
for Concept 2 democracy is not pragmatic, for it not only has
inconsistencies with Posner’s own version of pragmatism but also radically
diverges from some of the most fundamental notions of the classical
pragmatists. Having built his theory on pragmatic ideas, Posner must deal
with their implications, which we argue undermine his theory of
democracy. Additionally, we contend that pragmatism does have a political
valence—one that links it more closely with Concept 1 democracy than
Concept 2.
I. PRAGMATISM
Posner has two goals in writing his book. He aims to explore the
implications of pragmatism in law and to discuss the relationship between
legal pragmatism and democracy.30 The central thrust of pragmatism for
Posner is the rejection of “pieties” and “conceptualisms.” “Among the
conceptualisms rejected are moral, legal, and political theory when offered
to guide legal and other official decisionmaking.”31
Although acknowledging roots in a lineage of classical pragmatists
and adopting many of the key ideas of these thinkers, Posner breaks ranks
with them, advocating a brand of pragmatism he calls “everyday
pragmatism.”32 Posner labels the contemporary philosophical tradition that
has grown out of pragmatism as “orthodox,” and concludes that “orthodox
pragmatism has little to contribute to law at the operational level. It has
become a part of technical philosophy, in which few judges or practicing
lawyers take any interest.”33 The problem with orthodox pragmatism stems
from a problem with philosophy more generally. Philosophy, for Posner,
has little of use to say about legal and political issues. Therefore, “appeals
to pragmatism to guide adjudication and other governmental action should
largely be cut loose from philosophy.”34 Posner goes on to critique Richard
Rorty, John Dewey, and other theorists who hope to “enable philosophers
to make a constructive contribution to the solution of practical social
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

POSNER, supra note 6, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 4.
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problems, including legal problems.”35 For Posner, this task is not
feasible.36 The problem, in short, is philosophy, and Posner attempts to
skim off the top of pragmatism several of its key ideas and discard the rest.
The end product is “everyday pragmatism,” a leaner, more useful, more
practical pragmatism. As Posner describes it, “Everyday pragmatism is the
mindset denoted by the popular usage of the word ‘pragmatic,’ meaning
practical and business-like, ‘no-nonsense,’ disdainful of abstract theory and
intellectual pretension, contemptuous of moralizers and utopian
dreamers.”37
According to Posner, “Everyday pragmatists tend to be ‘dry,’
no-nonsense types. Philosophical pragmatists tend to be ‘wets,’ and to
believe that somehow their philosophy really can clear the decks for liberal
social policies, though this is largely an accident of the fact that John
Dewey was a prominent liberal.”38 Pragmatism’s “core is merely a
disposition to base action on facts and consequences rather than on
conceptualisms, generalities, pieties, and slogans.”39
Posner observes that pragmatism “is not hostile to all theory. . . . [It] is
hostile to the idea of using abstract moral and political theory to guide
judicial decisionmaking.”40 In contrast, “theories that seek to guide
empirical inquiry are welcomed in pragmatic adjudication.”41 Although the
pragmatist is open-minded to insights from a variety of disciplines,42 she
should be wary of philosophy, which for Posner is little more than
“intellectual pretension” that isn’t helpful in grappling with legal and policy
issues.43 Therefore, the Posnerian pragmatist should reject philosophical
theory as having no role to play in the law.
Posner is not alone in his view that pragmatism urges the abandonment
of philosophical theorizing. Indeed, pragmatism is often criticized for being
antitheoretical. For example, Steven Smith argues that “[l]egal pragmatism
is best understood as a kind of exhortation about theorizing.”44
This thin account of pragmatism runs into serious problems, however,
when it comes to guiding the normative ends we should adopt. These
35. Id. at 13. Interestingly, Posner refers to Dewey as “Professor Dewey” as he criticizes
Dewey’s more radical ideas about democracy and politics. See id. at 112.
36. See id. at 13.
37. Id. at 49-50.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 60.
41. Id. at 77.
42. As Daniel Farber notes, “In the legal context, pragmatism implies a certain degree of
eclecticism. Pragmatism provides no reason to exclude consideration of original intent, precedent,
philosophy, social science, or anything else that might be appropriate and helpful in resolving a
hard case.” Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 169.
43. POSNER, supra note 6, at 50.
44. Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 411 (1990).
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problems emerge most explicitly when Posner discusses how the pragmatic
judge should adjudicate cases. In articulating his account of pragmatic
adjudication, he describes pragmatism as a method that is helpful in
analyzing whether the means we select can further our ends. But Posner’s
pragmatism has little to say about the normative ends we choose to adopt.
Critics of pragmatism often attack pragmatism on this basis, dismissing it as
empty. Pragmatism, on this account, is nothing more than a tool that can be
used by anybody to achieve whatever ends they have in mind. But as we
demonstrate, pragmatism can have something to say about our normative
ends. Although Posnerian pragmatism rings hollow, a thicker account of
pragmatism amounts to much more.
A. Means and Ends
Posner begins his account of pragmatic adjudication by defending it
against charges that it counsels judges to ignore precedent and decide cases
simply based on their personal views about the best outcome. Ronald
Dworkin, legal pragmatism’s well-known nemesis, argues that pragmatism
is disrespectful of the past in general, and precedent in particular. In Law’s
Empire, he writes, “The pragmatist thinks judges should always do the best
they can for the future, in the circumstances, unchecked by any need to
respect or secure consistency in principle with what other officials have
done or will do.”45 Dworkin views the pragmatist as focused almost
exclusively on expediency, and he is not alone in this view.46
Posner emphatically and correctly rejects this account of pragmatic
adjudication. He notes that it is true that the pragmatic judge does not feel
any special duty to follow past precedent: “The pragmatist values continuity
with past enactments and decisions, but because such continuity is indeed a
social value, not because he feels a sense of duty to the past.”47 This does
not imply that the pragmatist will simply do whatever she pleases, without
any respect for precedent. Rather, “[l]egal pragmatism is forward-looking,
regarding adherence to past decisions as a (qualified) necessity rather than
as an ethical duty.”48 Posner correctly contends that the pragmatist has
instrumental reasons for adhering to precedent. Failure to follow precedent
will undermine the stability of the legal system, which depends upon
predictability and fairness (understood as treating like cases alike).49
45. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 161 (1986).
46. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 27, at 44.
47. POSNER, supra note 6, at 71.
48. Id. at 60.
49. Of course, it is still no easy matter to determine whether or not a precedent applies along
the formalist model. One has to determine that the present facts are similar in the relevant way to
the facts of the past case, and there can be, therefore, great difficulties in predicting the action of
the courts even if they maintain a staunch commitment to taking precedent seriously.
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Moreover, past decisions may helpfully inform our present investigations.
Thus, Dworkin and other critics of pragmatic adjudication fail to recognize
that the pragmatist has good reasons to respect precedent.
Further, Posner argues that “[p]ragmatic adjudication is not, as its
ill-wishers charge, a synonym for ad hoc decisionmaking, that is, for always
deciding a case in the way that will have the best immediate
consequences . . . . Such an approach would be unpragmatic in disregarding
the adverse systemic consequences of ad hoc adjudication.”50 In other
words, concludes Posner, “‘[s]hortsighted’ is not part of the definition of
‘pragmatic.’”51
Nevertheless, despite Posner’s dispute with critics such as Dworkin, it
turns out that they all share an impoverished notion of pragmatism rooted in
a similar mistake. After Posner refutes the argument that judges should
respect precedent for its own sake, he then goes too far in the other
direction. He argues that “[t]he past is a repository of useful information,
but it has no claim on us. The criterion for whether we should adhere to past
practices is the consequences of doing so for now and the future.”52
Posner’s insistence that the past has no claim on us is problematic,
especially in our constitutional democracy. It conjures up images of the
judge arriving on a scene armed with a storehouse of “facts” from the past,
and then rendering her choice in light of whatever ends she has in mind.
The origin of these ends apparently does not need to be accounted for.
Dworkin has a valid criticism when he argues that, for adjudication in a
constitutional democracy, these ends do need to be accounted for. Thus,
both Posner and Dworkin view the pragmatist judge as deciding according
to unjustified ends.
Although Posner does recognize that the pragmatic judge must
determine which consequences “are good and which bad, let alone how
much weight to place on each consequence,” and that “goodness and
badness are to be determined by reference to human needs and interests,”
he also suggests that “nothing in consequentialism or pragmatism helps to
determine them.”53 Therefore, “different judges, each with his own idea of
the community’s needs and interests, will weigh consequences
differently.”54 The solution is thus a diverse judiciary because “[s]uch a
judiciary is more representative, and its decisions will therefore command

50. POSNER, supra note 6, at 60. Margaret Radin offers a critique of Dworkin along similar
lines. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND
SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 127, 145-47.
51. POSNER, supra note 6, at 60.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id.
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greater acceptance in a diverse society than would the decisions of a
mandarin court.”55
If pragmatism cannot help us assess the goodness and badness of our
ends, then it seems fair to say that the pragmatist simply accepts (or
inherits) her ends uncritically. This reduces the contribution of pragmatism
to merely aiding the selection of means to achieve particular ends. When
asked about which ends to choose, Posner has nothing to say.56 For him,
pragmatism is value-neutral and “has no moral compass.”57 As Posner has
stated time and again, pragmatism has “no inherent political valence.”58 The
notion that pragmatism is neutral hearkens back to William James, who
wrote that pragmatism “stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas,
and no doctrines save its method.”59
This account of pragmatism is shared by many neopragmatists as well
as their critics. For example, Brian Tamanaha has stated that “pragmatism
is empty of substance,” and he contends that “[p]ragmatism does not say
what the good is, how to live, what economic or political system to develop,
or anything else of that nature.”60 Lynn Baker’s critique of the pragmatism
of Richard Rorty goes even further, suggesting that contemporary
pragmatism not only lacks substance, but is also merely an exhortation to
privilege action over theory: “In the end, pragmatism appears to be useful
in achieving progressive social change to the extent that one profits from
statements such as, ‘There is no method or procedure to be followed except
courageous and imaginative experimentation.’ Or, as the Nike people say,
‘Just do it.’”61
It is this account of pragmatism that Dworkin critiques, and rightly so.
Dworkin is correct that we must justify the legitimacy of the ends we select
to guide our adjudication. Since citizens do not vote on every issue, and
55. Id. at 120 (footnote omitted).
56. See id. at 105-06.
57. Id. at 55.
58. Id. at 84; see also POSNER, supra note 19, at 393.
59. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 54
(1907).
60. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative
Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 328
(1996).
61. Baker, supra note 27, at 718 (quoting Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, 30
MICH. Q. REV. 231, 242 (1991)), reprinted in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 3,
at 115. In another example of this critique, Alan Ryan, in his New York Times review of Law,
Pragmatism, and Democracy, concludes that Posner’s “argument is an elegant illustration of what
is lost by Pragmatism’s abandonment of principle.” Alan Ryan, The Legal Theory of No Legal
Theory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, § 7, at 20. In Coleman’s recent examination of pragmatism
(on a point where we believe that Coleman’s pragmatism, indebted as it is to Quine and Sellars,
also shares much with Dewey), he aptly recognizes the tight relationship between pragmatism and
principle that belies Ryan’s critique. Coleman writes: “In saying that pragmatism recognizes
explanation by embodiment as a legitimate form of philosophical explanation of a practice, I mean
that in certain kinds of practices, the inferential roles of concepts may be seen to hang together in
a way that reflects a general principle.” COLEMAN, supra note 29, at 8.
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since we are bound by a Constitution that circumscribes our ordinary
lawmaking, it is important for judges to demonstrate the legitimacy of the
principles, ends, and ideals they invoke. To do so, they need to explain at
least two things: (1) why they believe that one set of ends provides a better
account of our present practices and of who we are as a People, and (2)
what the implications of that account are for addressing the present
problems we face and our choices about who we as a People will become.62
Dworkin’s concerns have merit, but his critique is misplaced when he
speaks of pragmatism beyond Posner’s account. The inability of Posner’s
pragmatism to respond effectively to this critique stems from Posner’s view
of the relationship between theory and practice—as though “everyday”
practice is somehow without theoretical dimensions. But as we argue
below, pragmatism need not adopt this view, and hence, need not lead us to
this dead end.
B. Theory and Practice
1. The Role of Philosophical Theory
At the heart of Posner’s pragmatism is a particular understanding of the
relationship between theory and practice. For Posner, theory has little to
offer practice, and he has engaged in an ongoing quest to attack academic
theorists. Posner is building on work from his 1999 book, The Problematics
of Moral and Legal Theory,63 in which he attacked legal and moral theory,
and his 2001 book, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline,64 in which he
argued that public intellectuals are increasingly unhelpful in grappling with
legal and policy issues. In Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Posner uses
his notion of everyday pragmatism to argue that whereas disciplines like
economics, sociology, and biology are useful in the law, philosophy is more
of a hindrance than a help. According to Posner, academics are insulated
from the “real” world and tend to become easily infatuated with empty
abstractions such as justice, fairness, and equality. Posner argues that
“academic philosophy” is “a field that has essentially no audience among
judges and lawyers—let alone among politicians—even when philosophy is
taken up by law professors . . . who think it should influence law.”65 Legal
pragmatists reject “abstract theorizing of which professors of constitutional

62. See J.M. Balkin, The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 WIDENER
L. SYMP. J. 167, 180 (1999) (“Constitutional stories constitute us as a people with a purpose and a
trajectory: They remind us what we have done in the past and therefore what we should be doing
today. They explain to us where we have been and therefore where we should be going.”).
63. POSNER, supra note 28.
64. RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2001).
65. POSNER, supra note 6, at 11.
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law are enamored, in which decisions are evaluated by reference to
abstractions common in law talk such as fairness, justice, autonomy, and
equality.”66 Further, Posner argues, when pragmatists examine a
constitutional issue, such as “whether per-pupil expenditures on public
school education should be equalized across school districts,” the
pragmatist avoids “question-begging vacuities (such as ‘equality’ and
‘fundamental rights’).”67 “What sensible person,” he asks, “would be
guided in such difficult, contentious, and fact-laden matters by a
philosopher or his law-professor knock-off?”68
One can understand Posner’s concerns. Much theoretical academic
work participates in a private conversation far removed from the pressing
social problems of the day. Philosophical discourse, whether in academic
philosophy or in legal theory, can be overly abstract, filled with jargon, and
disconnected from current practice. The result is an insular world in an
ivory tower, where academics talk mostly among themselves, producing a
parade of half-baked ideas and impractical suggestions for reform.
In making this criticism, Posner echoes Dewey, who also staunchly
criticized the academy for theorizing abstractly without attempting to
connect theory to current practice. Dewey attacked theorizing that
“becomes arbitrary, aloof—what is called ‘abstract’ when that word is used
in a bad sense to designate something which exclusively occupies a realm
of its own without contact with the things of ordinary experience.”69 Dewey
criticized philosophy that attempted to treat itself as something more lofty
than other forms of knowledge, as “a realm of higher Being” with “air purer
than that in which exist the making and doing that relate to livelihood.”70
Like Dewey, Posner is right to criticize academic theorists who view their
theorizing as a higher and purer activity than disciplines that employ
empirical methods of analysis.
Dewey was very critical of academic departments for creating
pseudoproblems—taking problems from general experience and converting
them into philosophical puzzles with a life of their own, disconnected from
their origins in experience.71 Philosophy should begin in ordinary life with

66. Id. at 79.
67. Id. at 79-80.
68. Id. at 80.
69. JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 9 (Open Court Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1929) (1925),
reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 3, 17.
70. JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 14 (1929), reprinted in 4 JOHN DEWEY: THE
LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 3, 11-12.
71. See DEWEY, supra note 69, at 27-28, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS,
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 34 (“Empirical method finds and points to the operation of choice as
it does to any other event. Thus it protects us from conversion of eventual functions into
antecedent existence: a conversion that may be said to be the philosophic fallacy, whether it be
performed in behalf of mathematical subsistences, esthetic essences, the purely physical order of
nature, or God.”).
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the concerns, pressures, and facts of contemporary existence.72 For Dewey,
“Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with
the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by
philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men.”73 Accordingly, Dewey
believed a “first-rate test” of the value of any philosophy consists in its
answer to this question: “Does it end in conclusions which, when they are
referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render
them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with
them more fruitful?”74
If a philosophy is to meet this challenge, it must take as its starting
point the problems generated by our everyday practices. Likewise, a
philosophy of law, as Dewey observes, “cannot be set up as if it were a
separate entity, but can be discussed only in terms of the social conditions
in which it arises and of what it concretely does there.”75 Thus, as a
pragmatist, Posner is right to suggest that those interested in improving
legal methods and procedures should not look to academic philosophy or
law departments for ready-made answers. He is also right to insist that
constructive solutions usually require in-depth investigations of the facts.
Posner also astutely argues that work should be done in what he calls
the “empirical lowlands.”76 As Posner observes, “The theoretical uplands,
where democratic and judicial ideals are debated, tend to be arid and
overgrazed; the empirical lowlands are fertile but rarely cultivated.”77 The
uplands are thus theoretical discourses that ask questions about the nature
of justice, equality, and the good. The lowlands are efforts to explore
empirically the results of our social practices. It is one thing to argue about
the justification for policies such as affirmative action by sparring over
competing conceptions of fairness, but more important to the pragmatist is
understanding the consequences of such rhetoric in practice.78 What results
are produced by affirmative action policies? Posner, like Dewey, thinks that
theoretically minded individuals concerned with questions of justice and the
72. See JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 25-27 (1920), reprinted in 12 JOHN
DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, at 77, 94 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1976).
73. John Dewey, The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, in CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE:
ESSAYS IN THE PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE 3, 65 (1917), reprinted in 10 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE
WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 3, 46.
74. DEWEY, supra note 69, at 9-10, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 19251953, supra note 11, at 18.
75. John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 73, 77 (Julius Rosenthal Found., Northwestern Univ. ed., 1941), reprinted
in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 115, 117.
76. POSNER, supra note 6, at 3.
77. Id. at 3-4. Despite this observation, Posner continues to produce work in the “theoretical
uplands” that calls for more work in the lowlands.
78. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE
AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 315-87 (2001) (discussing the empirical effects of affirmative
action at FCC auctions).
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like could accomplish much more by investigating these conceptions in the
context of particular practices. Not only would they help to ameliorate
present problems, but they would also be submitting their ideals to the test
of experience. Indeed, law is an excellent field for the pragmatist since it
provides a forum to investigate concretely the meaning of our ideals.
But Posner then takes a wrong turn. He equates philosophy exclusively
to the work of academic departments in universities, and then he rejects
philosophy wholesale. The practice of philosophy, however, is much
broader than the practice of professors in academic institutions, and even
the philosophy of the academy is far from monochromatic. Whether
someone is a philosopher is a function of the questions she asks and the
writing she does, not whether she is employed by a philosophy department.
Philosophy is not the exclusive domain of academic philosophers; rather, it
is the development of intelligent, critical, and reconstructive methods for
approaching the problems of lived experience. Philosophy is something that
everyone does or at least can do, not an insular club that only those in the
ivory tower can join. Therefore, although the academic practice of
philosophy often can be overly technical and disengaged from the problems
of society, this does not imply that philosophy should be abandoned.79
Posner’s account of pragmatism, as rejecting a role for philosophical
theory, stems in part from a misunderstanding of the pragmatic
79. Pragmatists like John Lachs have taken a different approach, based in part on a different
understanding of the reasons for academic insularity. Lachs believes that the insularity is less a
function of the subject matter that academics discuss, and more a function of institutional
structures that reward and punish their behavior. Instead of concluding, as Posner does, that
academic discussions are insular and therefore unimportant, he concludes that they are important
but insulated. Accordingly, his recommendation is not to have the public ignore the academy, but
rather to have the academy stop ignoring the public:
If encouraging intellectuals to engage in public debate does not work, we may
have to make it mandatory. . . . In the long run, intellectuals have to understand that
they are on the payroll of the community in order, among other things, to warn us about
our ways, to help us see our practices in perspective, to present arguments against what
we are bent on doing, and, again and again, to present interesting alternatives. Their job
is to shake up state and institutional orthodoxies, instead of working to preserve them.
JOHN LACHS, A COMMUNITY OF INDIVIDUALS 8-9 (2003).
In fact, even in the academy there have been considerable reconstructive projects involving
the environment, health, art, education, politics, and to a lesser extent, law. E.g., LARRY
HICKMAN, JOHN DEWEY’S PRAGMATIC TECHNOLOGY (1992) (developing the basis for a
pragmatic criticism of modern approaches to understanding technology); RICHARD SHUSTERMAN,
PRAGMATIST AESTHETICS: LIVING BEAUTY, RETHINKING ART (Rowman & Littlefield 2000)
(1992) (exploring how pragmatist conceptions of aesthetics provide for richer imaginative and
critical relationships to present art forms); BETH J. SINGER, PRAGMATISM, RIGHTS, AND
DEMOCRACY (1999) (developing the implications of a theory of rights within a pragmatist
tradition); SHANNON SULLIVAN, LIVING ACROSS AND THROUGH SKINS: TRANSACTIONAL
BODIES, PRAGMATISM, AND FEMINISM (2001) (developing Dewey’s notion of “transaction” and
its consequences for understanding gender); Glenn McGee, Pragmatic Method and Bioethics, in
PRAGMATIC BIOETHICS 27 (Glenn McGee ed., 1999) (arguing that reconstructing the classic
theory/practice dualism in the context of bioethics will enable recognition of the lack of neutrality
of the bioethicist, “a community member who is intractably involved and invested and has
particular interests”).
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reconstruction of the theory/practice relationship. Under the traditional
model of the theory/practice relationship, philosophical theory is seen as
offering a foundation for practice. One should learn the theory and then put
it into practice. But pragmatists, such as Dewey, never expected theory to
guide practice in this way and never pretended that practice was
independent of theory. Rather than embrace this dualism, the classical
pragmatists sought to make practice more intelligent and more critical, in
part by recognizing its theoretical dimension. This does not require
theoretical reason capable of determining its goals outside of historical
practices; rather it requires a critical and reconstructive approach to social
institutions and practices. As Thomas Grey notes, “[T]hought always comes
embodied in practices—culturally embedded habits and patterns of
expectation, behavior, and response.”80
Insofar as the language of “justice” has been dominated by Kantian
moralists who believe that our regulative ideals are the product of pure
reason, then one can understand Posner’s reservations.81 Terms like
“justice” and “freedom” are not backed up by reference to Platonic forms,
but are the products of our human experience and contested history.82 We
don’t look to theory to tell us what “democracy,” “justice,” “equality,” and
“freedom” mean. We look to our experience of past practices. Under this
view, “theory” is a statement of the insights, often generalized, formed as a
result of the success and failures of these practices. As Dewey observed,
“[W]e institute standards of justice, truth, esthetic quality, etc., in order that
different objects and events may be so intelligently compared with one

80. Thomas C. Grey, What Good Is Legal Pragmatism?, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND
SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 9, 12.
81. Dewey shared this concern:
[M]any moral theories, some of them of considerable prestige in philosophy, have
interpreted moral subject-matter in terms of norms, standards, ideals, which, according
to the authors of these theories, have no possible factual standing. “Reasons” for
adopting and following them then involve a “reason” and “rational” in a sense which is
expressly asserted to be transcendent, a priori, supernal, “other-worldly.”
John Dewey, Ethical Subject-Matter and Language, 42 J. PHIL. 701, 711 (1945), reprinted in 15
JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 127, 139.
82. As the person credited for the inception of American pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, has
pointed out, pragmatism has a theory of meaning that insists that to understand a concept is to
understand the conceivable sensible effects of that concept. This does not mean one cannot use
words such as “justice,” “fairness,” and “equality,” but that one must understand the meaning of
the terms not by reference to Platonic forms, but by reference to the practical consequences they
entail. CHARLES PEIRCE, How To Make Our Ideas Clear, in 1 THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS, 1867-1893, at 132 (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992);
see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 267, 305 (1997) (“[P]ragmatism clearly has nothing against distinctions, definitions,
coherence, abstract argument, or theoretical edifices: it is at least an open question whether or not
these tools of the intellect are or are not useful for human purposes.”).
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another as to give direction to activities dealing with concrete objects and
affairs . . . .”83
The risk with Posner’s antiabstraction strategy is that it silences
meaningful community discussion. Terms such as “justice” and “equality”
are not only used in the academy, but also are part of popular social
discourse. Many people talk about intrinsic goods and understand freedom
as the ability to fulfill their desires.84 Whereas Dewey offers us tools to
reconstruct the meaning of these terms by giving priority to experience,
Posner advises us to avoid the terms. The result may be that they remain to
do mischief having been insulated from critical attention.
By eliminating philosophical theorizing, Posner discards pragmatic
tools for transforming existing institutions, customs, and social norms.
Without a role for philosophical theorizing, Posner’s pragmatism looks less
to opportunities for criticism and reconstruction of unsatisfactory practices,
the two hallmarks of the Deweyan pragmatic approach,85 and more to
opportunities for affirmation and acquiescence to the status quo. Such an
account of pragmatism leads critics such as David Luban to conclude that
“[p]ragmatism represents in the arena of conceptual change what Burke
represents in that of political change: a cautionary voice protesting those
who seek to overthrow the amassed wisdom of generations on no better
basis than the trifling speculations of philosophers.”86
Because it rejects any way to discuss the selection of ends, Posnerian
pragmatism has little choice but to accept uncritically the dominant ends of
society. This result is rather ironic considering Posner’s claim that
pragmatism has no political valence. Since Posner’s pragmatism lacks the
tools to engage in more radical social reform, it becomes a rather
conservative philosophy in the Burkean sense. It ends up inhibiting the
kinds of philosophical inquiries necessary to question the status quo.
Therefore, the effects of Posnerian pragmatism are anything but neutral.

83. JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 216 (1938), reprinted in 12 JOHN
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 1, 216-17. As Margaret Radin
correctly argues, “[I]deal theory is also necessary, because we need to know what we are trying to
achieve. In other words, our visions and nonideal decisions, our theory and practice, paradoxically
constitute each other.” Radin, supra note 50, at 129.
84. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Shocking the Conscience: Pragmatism, Moral Reasoning, and
the Judiciary, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 675, 690 (1999) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 28)
(“[M]oral conceptualism is an intellectual tumor that Posner would like to remove. But as with
certain tumors, it is doubtful that we can excise every trace of these moral conceptions from the
legal mind without fatally impairing vital functions.”).
85. See John J. Stuhr, Democracy as a Way of Life, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE: PRAGMATIC ESSAYS AFTER DEWEY 37, 40 (John J. Stuhr ed.,
1993) (observing that for Dewey, “philosophy is inherently criticism and reconstruction”
(citations omitted)).
86. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 138 (1994).
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2. Philosophical Theory and Ends
Posner’s pragmatism fails to point us toward productive inquiries for
resolving legal and policy issues, for these issues involve the choice of
ends. In contrast to Posner’s account, Deweyan pragmatism provides for a
more fruitful inquiry into our selection of ends. Under this account of
pragmatism, unlike Posner’s, philosophy plays an essential role. Dewey
sees philosophy as critical inquiry, which aims to unsettle status quo
assumptions and then provide guidance for projects of social reconstruction.
Dewey observed that we often act out of habit, which is “an
ability . . . formed through past experience.”87 While we need habit in order
to function, habit can restrict the “reach” of our intellect, and can “fix its
boundaries.”88
Social customs are aggregations of habits; they “persist because
individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by prior
customs.”89 The problem with customs is that they can be “inert” and can
readily lead “into conformity, constriction, surrender of scepticism and
experiment.”90 Maintaining institutions without change can lead to social
stagnation. The goal of philosophical inquiry is thus to make habits “more
intelligent,” by which Dewey means “more sensitively percipient, more
informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct
and sincere, more flexibly responsive than those now current.”91 Rather
than be controlled by habit and custom, we must strive toward the
intelligent control of habit.92 This involves criticizing current institutions
and finding ways to reconstruct them. Of course, Dewey observed, we
cannot abandon our institutions, as this would lead to “chaos and anarchy”;
rather, we must “make over these institutions so that they serve under
changing conditions.”93
As a pragmatist, Posner is wrong to shrug off the hard work of
justifying the ends our legal system pursues. The pragmatist does have
something to say about our ends. The pragmatist justifies her value
commitments, in part, by analyzing their historical genesis. Guiding ideals
87. JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 66 (1922), reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY:
THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 4, 48.
88. Id. at 172, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72,
at 121.
89. Id. at 58, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72,
at 43.
90. Id. at 64, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72,
at 47.
91. Id. at 128, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72,
at 90.
92. Id. at 20, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72,
at 17-18.
93. John Dewey, Evolution and Ethics, 8 MONIST 321, 335 (1898), reprinted in 5 JOHN
DEWEY: THE EARLY WORKS, 1882-1898, at 34, 48 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1967).
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such as “fairness,” “justice,” and “freedom” must be critically examined by
looking to past experience. Posner complains that such ideals are empty
abstractions, useless for assisting us in decisions.94 Yet they are rendered
useless not because they are abstractions, but because insufficient effort is
made to critically explore their genesis and the consequences of their
deployment in various contexts.
Pragmatists are committed to finding substantive sustenance for their
guiding ideals through experiential inquiry. This requires difficult historical
investigation and interpretation.95 There is no guarantee that one account
will emerge as superior to all others, although many accounts, upon careful
investigation, are shown to be wanting. If a particular view of justice or
democracy is to be favored, it should be favored because of its past
consequences and in light of its anticipated future consequences. Those in
disagreement over political ends need not refrain from invoking
considerations of justice, freedom, equality, and democracy, but they must
not let matters rest there. They must explain the experiential basis for their
choices. Given an assessment of our past experiences and practices, why
should we prefer an account of democracy that tries to increase the
participation of all citizens? Alternatively, why should we prefer to
minimize the participation of most citizens? This is the discussion that we
need to have.
The pragmatist need not be a shallow empiricist who has something to
say about means but nothing much to say about ends. The pragmatist need
not eschew philosophical theorizing or discussion of regulative ideals. Far
from being a mere method that provides little guidance as to our normative
ends, pragmatism facilitates philosophical debates about them in ways that
avoid appealing to hollow abstractions. Pragmatism is thus an invitation to
a different kind of debate, a debate that the Posnerian pragmatist ignores.
Posner is mistaken, therefore, when he proposes that there is nothing
useful to be done in terms of critically assessing our value commitments.
He appears to view ends as little more than mere tastes. As a result, he does
not seem to believe that discussion about our ends will be very fruitful. This
is why Posner ultimately recommends a diverse judiciary; at least different
ends can be represented, even if discussing them won’t lead us anywhere.
If Posner simply treats the selection of ends as the product of a judge’s
individual choice, those ends become insulated from critical scrutiny.
Pragmatism, by contrast, demands the critical assessment of our ends.

94. POSNER, supra note 6, at 76, 79-80.
95. As James Gouinlock points out in his seminal study on Dewey’s philosophy of value, one
consequence of Dewey’s naturalism is the recognition that ends are part of historical processes
and must be investigated as such. See JAMES GOUINLOCK, JOHN DEWEY’S PHILOSOPHY OF
VALUE 81 (1972) (“[E]nds are always ends of a [historical] process. They are not discontinuous
substances or events existing independently in nature.”).
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Where did they come from? What conditions were they responding to?
What have been the results? Who has benefited from their adoption? Who
has suffered? Have they been democratically selected?
As a result, the pragmatist would understand that any view of the best
future must be informed by a view of who we are as a People—and this
depends upon an interpretation of our history.96 As Justice Holmes correctly
noted, the obligation to history is not a duty (as Dworkin would have it) but
a necessity.97 Pragmatists recognize that ends are not ahistorical. Dewey
noted that “personal desire and belief [are] functions of habit and
custom.”98 We do not get our ends from some a priori source; they emerge
from experience. And our values originate not just from our own
experience, but from collective social experience, which has a long history
and is embodied in our current habits, customs, and traditions. In this way,
the past perpetuates itself; it has a hold on us.99 We cannot simply wipe the
slate clean or assume a “tabula rasa in order to permit the creation of a new
order.”100 We adopt the ends we do often because they are transmitted to us
by our parents, education, and culture. Dewey argued that we must consider
the history of any social end in both directions: its past and its future. “We
must consider it with reference to the antecedents which evoked it, and with
reference to its later career and fate.”101 We must look to the genesis of a
particular end because
[i]t arises in a certain context, and as a reaction to certain
circumstances; it has a subsequent history which can be traced. It
maintains and reinforces certain conditions, and modifies others. It
becomes a stimulus which provokes new modes of action. Now
when we see how and why the belief came about, and also know
what else came about because of it, we have a hold upon the worth

96. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331,
1350 (1988) (“For a pragmatist the analysis must start—but not finish—with an examination of
our constitutional text, history, and traditions.”).
97. Holmes wrote:
The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it
tends to become.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
98. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 161-62 (1927), reprinted in 2 JOHN
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 235, 336.
99. Id., reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 336.
100. Id. at 162, reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11,
at 336.
101. John Dewey, The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality (pt. 2), 11 PHIL. REV.
353, 359 (1902), reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at
3, 26.
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of the belief which is entirely wanting when we set it up as an
isolated intuition.102
Since ends do not emerge from a transcendent realm, the pragmatist
should not simply accept her own ends uncritically. She must subject them
to critical inquiry. According to Dewey, criticism occurs when we look “to
see what sort of value is present” and “instead of accepting a value-object
wholeheartedly . . . we raise even a shadow of a question about its
worth.”103 This involves understanding the origins of our ends, the reasons
for their existence, and whether these reasons warrant continued allegiance
today. Through pragmatic criticism, we may discover that particular ends
have merely survived through inertia or that the reasons for their existence
no longer apply to our present situation.
Therefore, to the extent that pragmatism is an “attitude,” it is one that is
radical, for it is skeptical and experimental. The pragmatic temperament is
one that is constantly prodding and questioning; it focuses on change and
transformation. Although the pragmatist need not be committed to radical
ends, she is committed to a radical kind of criticism and experimentation.
This does not mean that pragmatism must reject the status quo, but it does
mean that the pragmatist must be wary of accepting inherited ends
uncritically. Far from being mundane and banal, pragmatism takes up the
hard work of removing the blinders of existing habits, customs, and
conventions by testing accepted beliefs and “truths.” The result of this
attitude is a critical edge.
C. The Implications of Legal Pragmatism
In a number of examples sprinkled throughout the book, Posner
attempts to demonstrate how his legal pragmatism works in practice by
addressing specific legal and policy issues. Posner tackles a wide variety of
topics, including Bush v. Gore and the 2000 election deadlock, the Monica
Lewinsky scandal, antitrust law, Clinton v. Jones, judicial review, and
liberty and security after September 11. In many instances, Posner claims
that his conclusions are pragmatic, but this characterization becomes
dubious when his reasoning is considered more carefully. In particular, we
focus on his discussions of judicial review and liberty versus security.104
102. Id., reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 2627.
103. DEWEY, supra note 69, at 324, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 19251953, supra note 11, at 299.
104. We have selected these discussions because Posner has discussed many of his other
examples more extensively in other books. For example, Posner has discussed Bush v. Gore in
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
THE COURTS (2001); antitrust law in RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); and
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Posner attempts to reach legal and policy conclusions from his pragmatism,
but it is too thin to justify his conclusions, and Posner often ends up
contradicting his own pragmatic approach. In contrast, the alternative
account of pragmatism we have developed in previous Sections suggests
more productive forms of inquiry into these issues. Our goal is not to
engage in a direct debate with Posner over his conclusions, even though we
would probably reach different ones. Rather, we aim to critique the way
that Posner goes about reaching his conclusions, his method of reasoning
and analysis.
1. Judicial Restraint Versus Judicial Activism
Posner argues that an “implication for law of Dewey’s epistemology is
that courts should either have no power to invalidate legislation or exercise
it only in extreme circumstances, when faced by a law patently
unconstitutional or utterly appalling.”105 This is the language of judicial
restraint, and Posner is alluding to Justice Holmes’s famous “puke test,”
which holds laws unconstitutional only when they are so despicable that
they make one puke. For Posner, “By invalidating legislation, courts
prevent political experimentation.”106 “In Dewey’s intellectual universe,
invalidating a statute is not just checking a political preference. It is
profoundly rather than merely superficially undemocratic . . . . It places
expert opinion over the distributed intelligence of the mass of the people
and prevents the emergence of the best policies through intellectual natural
selection.”107 Thus, Posner argues that Deweyan pragmatists on their own
terms must support judicial restraint.
This conclusion is false, and the argument that leads to it is invalid. In
contrast to Posner, who speaks in a generalized, ahistorical manner, the
Deweyan pragmatist would be reluctant to conclude that judicial restraint,
or any judicial style, would be better at all times and in every situation
throughout history. Holmes judged at a different point during our history;
perhaps in his time judicial restraint was a pragmatic response. But it
certainly doesn’t mean that judicial restraint is always demanded by
pragmatism. To justify judicial restraint, the pragmatist would examine why
it is best at this particular point in our history. Ironically, just a few pages
earlier in the book, Posner seems to recognize this point. He extols Chief
Justice John Marshall as an exemplar of pragmatism in judging.108 Posner

the Clinton scandal in RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999).
105. POSNER, supra note 6, at 121.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 122.
108. See id. at 86.
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defends Marshall against attacks that he was too formalistic and relied more
on rhetoric than reason.109 “‘Marshall created judicial review as a pragmatic
response to the inevitable crisis over the role of the judiciary in the
constitutional scheme.’”110 Marshall, whose judicial style certainly cannot
be described as judicial restraint, nevertheless was pragmatic according to
Posner because he had an “extraordinary fit with his times.”111
If Posner is correct about Marshall, then it certainly does not follow that
the pragmatist should favor judicial restraint over activism in principle.
Instead, if Posner were to argue pragmatically for judicial restraint, he
would need to justify why, based upon past experience and an analysis of
our current problems, judicial restraint is the most appropriate response at
this time in our history. In light of the analysis of Marshall, one would
expect Posner to recognize that judicial restraint might not be appropriate in
all contexts, for all cases.
Posner seems to argue that since pragmatism advocates
experimentation in general, legislative experimentation should receive
deference from pragmatist jurists. But even if one were to accept such a
commitment to experimentation at face value, it would not follow that
judicial experimentation should be ruled out. Pragmatic experimentation
has no less value when it is practiced by the judiciary, and Posner provides
no reason why it should be limited merely to legislation.
Beyond this, one must be careful not to turn a commitment to
experimentation into its opposite. The claim of the classical pragmatists
was that scientific methods work better for grappling with our problems
than adherence to absolutes. It would be ironic to maintain an absolutist
commitment to experimentation in the name of pragmatism. The fact that
pragmatists recognize the experimental method’s virtues does not mean
they endorse experimentation in all forms and contexts. The pragmatic
commitment to experimentation, for example, doesn’t lead pragmatists to
favor the Nazi experimentation on humans. Pragmatism is a commitment to
an experimental method, one that keeps testing its conclusions in
experience. It is not a commitment to experimentation for its own sake.
Striking down a law, even one that is “experimental,” can still be a
pragmatic response. For example, legislatures can fail to be democratic. As
Posner himself recognizes, interest groups can have an overly strong
influence on legislation.112 Or legislatures can fail to adopt the appropriate

109. See id. at 92.
110. Id. at 91 (quoting ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS:
PRAGMATISM AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 168
(2000)). For a discussion of contemporary jurisprudential accounts of judicial review, see LIPKIN,
supra.
111. POSNER, supra note 6, at 92.
112. Id. at 198.
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means to achieve the stated end of a law.113 Judges, in part due to the
relatively insulated nature of the judiciary, can subject laws to critical
scrutiny when powerful lobbies seek to prevent legislatures from doing so.
As one of us has written elsewhere, the judiciary has the potential “to make
institutions more democratic and humane, to force officials to base their
policies on the best empirical research of the day, to be guided by
democratic values, to be more humble and skeptical of their own
practices.”114 Additionally, Daniel Farber observes that “[f]or the
pragmatist . . . the question of the advisability of judicial review turns on its
usefulness for promoting a flourishing democratic society—democratic not
just in the sense of ballot casting but also in the sense that citizens are in
charge of the intelligent development of their lives.”115 Thus, both judicial
activism and restraint can be pragmatic, even democratic, responses to the
problems of the present.
2. Liberty Versus Security
Posner also applies his pragmatism to an extensive discussion of civil
liberties and security.116 Posner contends that civil libertarians are
unpragmatic when they treat “our existing civil liberties—protections of
privacy, of the freedom of the press, of the rights of criminal suspects, and
the rest—as sacrosanct and insisting therefore that the battle against
international terrorism must accommodate itself to them.”117 Posner
engages in a cost-benefit analysis between liberty and security, and
concludes: “A pragmatist would say [civil liberties] should be curtailed to
the extent that the beneficial consequences for the safety of the
nation . . . outweigh the adverse impact on liberty.”118 Echoing Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Posner argues that although civil liberties should be
“curtailed in time of war or other national emergency,” civil libertarians
wrongly fear that this curtailment will serve as a “precedent in time of
peace.”119 Posner writes: “The events of September 11 revealed the United
States to be in greater jeopardy from international terrorism than had been

113. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 28, at 596 (“The project of independent empirical inquiry is
so inherently aggressive, and the likelihood that legislatures (especially state legislatures) have
acted sloppily or irrationally is so great, that a pragmatist such as Posner might find it hard, in
practice, to restrain himself from substituting his own judgment for that of the political branches
by following the facts to their logical conclusion.”).
114. Solove, supra note 20, at 1018.
115. Farber, supra note 96, at 1347-48.
116. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 292-321.
117. Id. at 296.
118. Id. at 298.
119. Id. at 304.
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believed by most people until then . . . . It stands to reason that such a
revelation would lead to our civil liberties being curtailed.”120
Posner seems to be suggesting that civil libertarians are unpragmatic
because they adhere to rights as absolutes. Posner attacks a caricature of the
civil libertarian argument, since many civil libertarians are pragmatists, not
absolutists. Posner also attacks civil libertarians when they offer “historical
examples of supposed overreactions to threats to national security.”121 In
contrast, he argues that history reveals that government officials have
“disastrously underestimated these dangers” rather than exaggerated
them.122 He elaborates:
Actually, the lesson of history is the opposite. Officialdom has
repeatedly and disastrously underestimated these dangers—whether
it is the danger of secession that led to the Civil War, or the danger
of a Japanese attack on the United States that led to the disaster at
Pearl Harbor, or the danger of Soviet espionage in the 1940s that
accelerated the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and
by doing so emboldened Stalin to encourage North Korea to invade
South Korea in 1950, or the installation in 1962 of Soviet missiles
in Cuba that precipitated the Cuban missile crisis, or the outbreaks
of urban violence and political assassinations in the 1960s, or the
Tet Offensive of 1968 in the Vietnam War, or the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 and subsequent taking of American diplomats
hostage, or the catastrophe of September 11, 2001.123
But these examples do not simply involve a tradeoff between liberty
and security. They are failures of foreign intelligence or political judgment.
The point of the civil libertarians is that the government has often
overreacted in curtailing liberty in times of crisis. Posner’s examples
involve the failure to anticipate security threats. Without demonstrating
how curtailing liberty would have improved our ability to avert these
events, Posner’s examples have little relevance.
Posner then contends that to the extent that the government did
overreact by curtailing liberty in times of crisis, we should not be
concerned, since “[t]he curtailment of civil liberties in the Civil War, World
War I (and the ensuing ‘Red Scare’), World War II, and the Cold War did
not outlast the emergencies.”124 But curtailments of liberties harmed
thousands of innocent citizens, sometimes quite severely. Just because the

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 298.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 304.

SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC

2003]

12/8/2003 12:00 PM

Radical Pragmatism

711

government eventually realizes it overreacted and apologizes doesn’t set
everything right. Apologies are meaningful when they guide future action.
In light of a history marred by frequent misguided responses to threats,
a pragmatic response would counsel caution. For example, in the early
years of J. Edgar Hoover’s reign over the FBI, from 1919 to 1920, the
government rounded up over 10,000 suspected communists, many without
warrants.125 In 1942, in the name of national security, the government
rounded up around 120,000 people of Japanese descent living on the West
Coast and imprisoned them in internment camps.126 In a series of cases,
including Korematsu v. United States,127 the Court upheld the internment as
constitutional under “most rigid scrutiny.”128 Few today would defend
Korematsu, but Posner, who is candid and unafraid to take controversial
positions, appears to support it. He asks: “If the Constitution is not to be
treated as a suicide pact, why should military exigencies not influence the
scope of the constitutional rights that the Supreme Court has manufactured
from the Constitution’s vague provisions?”129
The internment, however, has long been acknowledged to have been a
terrible mistake. Even the United States government has formally
apologized.130 Posner responds that we must be wary of lessons we draw
from the twenty-twenty vision of hindsight; just because the government’s
fears that Japanese Americans were engaged in dangerous acts of espionage
later proved to be false does not mean that at the time of the internment the
government was unjustified in taking action. But there was not much
evidence to support the government’s claims that the internment was
necessary or even that there was a significant threat posed by Japanese
Americans. Given historical tendencies of racial prejudice and the dangers
of making racial distinctions, the decision to carry out the internment
should have been viewed with great skepticism, especially considering the
fact that German Americans were not subjected to similar treatment.
Instead of analyzing the facts, however, the Supreme Court simply deferred
to the judgment of the government officials, accepting their claims about
the danger posed by Japanese Americans without critical scrutiny and
without demanding supporting evidence.131 Even if Posner is right to worry
125. See CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 75-76, 83, 93
(1991).
126. ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 38 (2001); see also Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
127. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
128. Id. at 216.
129. POSNER, supra note 6, at 294.
130. See COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED (1982).
131. The analysis of the Court in Korematsu was based in large part on the factual analysis in
an earlier case, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In Hirabayashi, the Court
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about the ease with which backward-looking criticism ignores the fears of
the moment, this does not imply that we must affirm those fears as
legitimate.
In addition to the Red Scare and Japanese internment, the McCarthy-era
hunt for communists during the 1950s has also been shown to have been a
severe overreaction. Recently released transcripts of secret Senate hearings
suggest that McCarthy may have deliberately misled the public about the
threat.132 The anticommunist movement resulted in terrible harm to many
individuals. Those exposed as communists faced retaliation in the private
sector, with numerous journalists, professors, entertainers, and others fired
from their jobs and blacklisted from future employment.133 Ellen Schrecker
notes that federal agencies exaggerated “the danger of radicalism” because
of the “desire to present themselves as protecting the community against the
threat of internal subversion.”134 Historians also argue that the
anticommunist movement was not merely a response to security concerns,
but also a means for carrying out the right-wing agendas of opportunistic
politicians.135
The pragmatist seeks to avoid these mistakes from occurring again; she
does not view them as inevitable. She studies the past to see if there are
better ways to distinguish the true threats from the manufactured ones. In
the past, government officials have seized upon fears of national security to
pursue their own personal agendas and prejudices. At the very least, an
examination of our history should make us more guarded and skeptical
when the government seeks to eliminate liberty in the name of security.
After September 11, the pattern appeared to be recurring. The
government rounded up thousands of people, restricted attorney-client
confidentiality, instituted military tribunals, secretly detained and
interrogated people, and increased electronic surveillance.136 Posner,
however, takes issue with those public intellectuals such as Bruce
Ackerman, Jeffrey Rosen, Michael Dorf, Ronald Dworkin, and Jack Balkin
who stepped forward to support civil liberties.137 He criticizes them for
concluded that it “is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of [government officials’]
action or substitute its judgment for theirs.” Id. at 93.
132. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Transcripts Detail Secret Questioning in 50’s by
McCarthy, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2003, at A1.
133. See ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 76-86 (1994); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The
Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13-71
(1991).
134. SCHRECKER, supra note 133, at 10.
135. See, e.g., id. at 92-94.
136. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 (2002).
137. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 311-15. For the articles Posner critiques, see Bruce
Ackerman, Don’t Panic, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 7, 2002, at 15; Jack M. Balkin, Using Our
Fears To Justify a Power Grab, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B15; Ronald Dworkin, The Threat
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being unpragmatic because legal thinkers simply lack the expertise to
understand international terrorism and to assess security risks adequately.138
But instead of offering a pragmatic evaluation of the full range of
consequences to these governmental actions, Posner merely states
abstractly that “liberty” must be sacrificed to protect “security.”139
Posner appears to assume that liberty and security must be mutually
exclusive, an assumption that is far from correct. Historically, America has
remained safe and secure despite its traditional support of civil liberties.
Might our tradition of civil liberties contribute to our safety? Not only may
curtailments of liberty bring us no greater security, but they also may lead
to insecurity. The pragmatist would certainly entertain this question and
would not be so fast to assume a dichotomous tradeoff between liberty and
security.
In fact, following the historical pattern in which Posner finds comfort,
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice recently reported that the
government overreacted after September 11 and improperly rounded up
numerous individuals.140 For Posner, this does not present much of a
problem, because overreaction is what normally happens in times of crisis.
The pragmatist, unlike Posner, would not confuse explanation for excuse.
Pragmatists would look to history and think about how we could better
grapple with crises and the tendency to respond with misguided measures
that often involve the use of racial and ethnic categories.
D. Reconstructing Legal Pragmatism
Posner presents pragmatism as a move away from abstract
philosophical theorizing and toward common sense. In his view,
pragmatism amounts to antifoundationalism coupled with a commitment to
“reasonableness” and being “realistic.” Posner has attempted to strip
pragmatism down to the bone, but in doing so he has distorted pragmatism
to such an extent that it not only diverges from the ideas of the classical
pragmatists, but runs counter to them. Posner’s rejection of philosophical
theory renders his pragmatism unable to tell us anything about how to
choose our ends. At most, then, Posnerian pragmatism can help us focus on
selecting the most efficient means to achieve our given ends; it amounts to
little more than an exhortation to be more empirical in assessing the
to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44; Jeffrey Rosen, Holding Pattern: Why
Congress Must Stop Ashcroft’s Alien Detentions, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001, at 16; and
Michael C. Dorf, What Is an “Unlawful Combatant” and Why It Matters, WRIT, Jan. 23, 2002, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020123.html.
138. POSNER, supra note 6, at 316.
139. Id. at 296-97.
140. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Report Faults the Roundup of Illegal Immigrants After 9/11,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A1.
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efficiency of our means. But legal and policy issues often cannot be
resolved without examining our ends. This is especially true with the kind
of contentious public law issues that Posner often addresses. Posner reaches
conclusions on these issues, but as we demonstrated, he does not reach
them pragmatically—even on his own terms.
The deficiencies of Posner’s pragmatism are caused in large part by his
characterization of guiding ideals such as justice, equality, and freedom as
mere empty abstractions, and his subsequent refusal to engage them. This is
a form of the theory/practice dualism, and it ends up supporting a very
conservative view of the everyday practices in which we engage, such as
the appropriate distribution of opportunities and resources. In his zeal to
attack insular academic philosophical theorizing in particular, Posner
inexplicably rejects philosophical questioning about our guiding ideals in
general. But everyday practices have a theoretical dimension; guiding ideals
are internal to our practices, not transcendent abstractions. Posnerian
pragmatism thus insulates existing practices from critical examination,
inhibiting the ability to transform them.
In doing so, Posner’s pragmatism departs dramatically from the
pragmatic tradition championed by William James and John Dewey.
Pragmatism does not reject a role for moral theorizing but recommends
instead that we critically reconstruct our normative ideals by testing them in
experience. The fact that ideals are not fixed absolutes but are subject to
revision and change doesn’t expose the bankruptcy of ideals; nor does it
mean that we should abandon any discussion of ideals or ends, since they
are essential for guiding our inquiries and practices. It means instead that,
as pragmatists, we must be willing to bring our ideals back down to earth,
to recognize their origin in past experience, and to subject them to criticism
and reconstruction as we employ them in present experience under changed
circumstances.
In this manner, pragmatism is not empty and devoid of substance.
Pragmatism has substantive commitments that are not separable from
method. In other words, no method of inquiry is neutral. All inquiry begins
with a particular direction, some preconceived notion of what is being
sought. Inquiry is thus not a wide open process that can lead anywhere. To
embark on an inquiry (or to adopt a method of inquiry) is already to head in
a particular direction. The starting points of pragmatic inquiry are certain
critical stances toward the status quo. This does not mean that one must
reject the status quo, but it requires an inquiry into certain assumptions and
basic social institutions that Posner will not undertake. In the end, one of
the consequences of Posner’s pragmatism is that it discourages
understanding debate over social ends as a worthwhile critical activity, and
therefore entrenches past results, insulating dominant social structures from
criticism.
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These points become more salient when Posner turns to using his
pragmatism to justify a theory of democracy. As we demonstrate in Part II,
Posner fails to show how his account of democracy follows from his
pragmatism, and he ends up justifying his theory in profoundly unpragmatic
ways. In contrast, we demonstrate the more fruitful and productive types of
inquiry into democracy that pragmatism has to offer.
II. DEMOCRACY
After articulating his account of pragmatism, Posner devotes the core of
his book to discussing democratic theory. He contrasts two concepts of
democracy, which he refers to as “Concept 1” and “Concept 2” democracy.
Posner defines Concept 1 democracy, which is often called “deliberative
democracy,” as “political democracy conceived of as the pooling of
different ideas and approaches and the selection of the best through debate
and discussion.”141 According to Posner, Concept 1 democracy views all
legally competent adults as having an equal “moral right” to participate in
societal governance.142 Citizens have the responsibility to be informed
about the issues, engage in open-minded dialogue with other citizens, and
“base [their] political opinions and actions (such as voting) on [their] honest
opinion, formed after due deliberation, of what is best for society as a
whole rather than on narrow self-interest.”143
Among the Concept 1 theorists that Posner identifies are John Rawls,
J rgen Habermas, Cass Sunstein, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson.144
The most notable Concept 1 theorist is John Dewey,145 who developed an
extensive theory of democracy in many of his works, including The Public
and Its Problems,146 Liberalism and Social Action,147 Individualism Old and
New,148 Democracy and Education,149 and Freedom and Culture,150 as well
as in numerous essays and portions of other books.151
141.
142.
143.
144.

POSNER, supra note 6, at 106-07; see also id. at 130-31.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id. at 14; see also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT (1996); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO
A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996); JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger
trans., MIT Press 1989) (1962); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
145. POSNER, supra note 6, at 186.
146. DEWEY, supra note 98, reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953,
supra note 11, at 235.
147. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935), reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY:
THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 1.
148. JOHN DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW (1930), reprinted in 5 JOHN DEWEY: THE
LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 41.
149. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916), reprinted in 9 JOHN DEWEY: THE
MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 1.
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In contrast to Concept 1, Posner advances an alternative notion of
democracy, which he calls “Concept 2” democracy. Concept 2 democracy
is based on Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of “elite democracy.”152 Concept 2
democracy is representative democracy, in which the bulk of the population
has little political involvement except for casting a vote every now and
then. “Concept 2 rejects the idea that democracy is self-government.
150. JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE (1939), reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE
LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 63.
151. See JOHN DEWEY, SOC’Y FOR ETHICAL CULTURE, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION IN
THE WORLD OF TODAY (1938), reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953,
supra note 11, at 294; John Dewey, Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us, in JOHN DEWEY
& THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 12 (Progressive Educ. Ass’n, Progressive Educ. Booklet No. 14,
1939), reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 224; John
Dewey, Democracy in Education, 4 ELEMENTARY SCH. TCHR. 193 (1903), reprinted in 3 JOHN
DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 229; John Dewey, The Democratic
Faith and Education, 4 ANTIOCH REV. 274 (1944), reprinted in 15 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER
WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 251; John Dewey, The Need of an Industrial Education in
an Industrial Democracy, in 17 MANUAL TRAINING & VOCATIONAL EDUC. 409 (1916), reprinted
in 10 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 137; John Dewey, A
Liberal Speaks Out for Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 23, 1936, at 3, reprinted in 11 JOHN
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 282; John Dewey, The Basic Values
and Loyalties of Democracy, AM. TCHR., May 1941, at 8, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE
LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 275; John Dewey, The Challenge of Democracy to
Education, PROGRESSIVE EDUC., Feb. 1937, at 79, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER
WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 181; John Dewey, Education, Democracy, and Socialized
Economy, SOC. FRONTIER, Dec. 1938, at 71, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS,
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 304; John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, SCH. & SOC’Y, Jan. 19,
1935, at 73, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 289;
John Dewey, Practical Democracy, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 2, 1925, at 52 [hereinafter Dewey,
Practical Democracy] (reviewing WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925)), reprinted
in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 213.
This list is far from exhaustive. Oddly, of the vast amount of work Dewey devoted to his
democratic theory, Posner focuses almost exclusively on The Public and Its Problems. In fact,
Posner rarely cites to any other works by John Dewey except a few essays by Dewey in law
reviews, such as, John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality,
35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); and John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17
(1924). Even when discussing Dewey’s metaphysics, citations to Dewey’s most famous works—
such as Experience and Nature, The Quest for Certainty, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Human
Nature and Conduct, and Reconstruction in Philosophy—are virtually nonexistent. The omission
of Experience and Nature is particularly unusual, since this was a book Justice Holmes (one of
Posner’s model judges) had read and praised very highly. Holmes “remarked that, though
‘incredibly ill written,’ it had ‘a feeling of intimacy with the inside of the cosmos that I found
unequaled. So methought God would have spoken had He been inarticulate but keenly desirous to
tell you how it was.’” ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 341
(1991) (quoting 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, 1874-1932, at 287 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1941)).
152. POSNER, supra note 6, at 130. Posner cites Schumpeter as the central theorist of Concept
2 democracy, but surprisingly does not comment upon Dewey’s debates with Walter Lippmann,
who argued in favor of elitist conceptions of democracy using many of the same reasons Posner
provides. See LIPPMANN, supra note 151; WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922). Dewey
had numerous debates with Lippmann. See Dewey, Practical Democracy, supra note 151,
reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 213; John Dewey,
Public Opinion, 30 NEW REPUBLIC 286 (1922) (reviewing LIPPMANN, supra), reprinted in 13
JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 337. For a discussion of these
debates within the historical circumstances of the time, see WESTBROOK, supra note 151, at
293-318.
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Democracy is government subject to electoral checks.”153 Interest groups
and elites run the show. “Successful [political] candidates are not random
draws from the public at large. They are smarter, better educated, more
ambitious, and wealthier than the average person.”154
Despite its reliance on elites, Concept 2 democracy is populist, Posner
argues, because it takes people as they are: Ordinary people simply don’t
have the expertise or time to be engaged in a robust political life. “Concept
2 is the democracy of interests and so of responsiveness to public opinion,
to what people want as distinct from what political theorists think they
should want or under different (better?) social or political conditions would
want.”155 Therefore, the goal of Concept 2 democracy is that “the interests
(preferences, values, opinions) of the population, whatever they may
happen to be, be represented in government.”156
Posner prefers Concept 2 democracy based on what he believes are
pragmatic grounds. Concept 2 democracy, says Posner, is “the democracy
of the pragmatists, more precisely of the everyday pragmatists.”157 To
justify why Concept 2 is better from the standpoint of pragmatic theory,
Posner makes two general arguments.
First, he contends that Concept 2 is a “more accurate description of
American democracy than Concept 1.”158 Posner criticizes Concept 1
democracy as being too idealistic and elitist. Concept 1 democracy is not
feasible; it is a utopian dream.159 It does not take people as they are; it
wants people to be more educated, more concerned about politics, more
civic-minded. Posner contends that Concept 2 is more realistic than
Concept 1. Concept 2 is “unillusioned about democracy.”160 It “best
describes the American political system today.”161 Concept 1 democracy
“places expert opinion over the distributed intelligence of the mass of the
people and prevents the emergence of the best policies through intellectual
natural selection.”162 Concept 1 theorists “envision moral argument on
political questions as taking place on a philosophical plane,”163 which is at a
level of sophistication beyond the comprehension of most American
citizens. In short, Concept 1 democracy is modeled on “a faculty
workshop.”164
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

POSNER, supra note 6, at 164.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 130.
See id. at 164-65.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 143.
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In contrast, Concept 2 does not have a “preconceived, idealized model
of democracy to which to compare the practice of American or any other
existing democracy.”165 Concept 2 “is inclined to take for granted the
features of democratic practice lamented by Concept 1 democrats.”166 To
sum up, “Concept 1 democracy” is “loftier,” “idealistic, theoretical, and
top-down,”167 whereas “Concept 2 democracy” is “realistic, cynical, and
bottom-up”—it is “pragmatic.”168
Second, Posner argues that Concept 2 is “normatively superior” to
Concept 1.169 Concept 2 enables people to pursue their private interests
without being overly sidetracked; it allows the more educated experts
to run the show; it maintains a firm political stability; and it enables
the public to check the governing elites if they completely ignore the
public’s interests.170 “Democracy as pictured by Concept 2 democrats is not
self-rule. It is rule by officials who are, however, chosen by the people and
who if they don’t perform to expectations are fired by the people at the end
of a short fixed or limited term of office.”171
Since Posner justifies his choice of Concept 2 democracy based on
pragmatism, he attempts to explain why Dewey, one of the leading
pragmatic theorists, chose Concept 1. Posner argues that Dewey’s views of
democracy are entirely separate from his pragmatic ideas. Thus, Posner
contends, Dewey’s political views “have no organic relation to his
philosophy” and belong instead “to his career as a public intellectual.”172
This move is essential for Posner, because Posner accepts many of Dewey’s
pragmatic ideas yet eschews Dewey’s liberal political philosophy.
According to Posner, Dewey’s faith in deliberative democracy was
misplaced, for Dewey wanted people “to think about political questions the
way scientists think about scientific ones—disinterestedly, intelligently,
empirically,” but he “succumbed to the intellectual’s typical mistake of
exaggerating the importance of intellect and of associated virtues such as
commitment to disinterested inquiry.”173 A pragmatist, Posner concludes,
should embrace Concept 2 because it is more realistic and practical than
Concept 1, and because it works better.
Posner’s account of democracy is deeply flawed on many levels. More
importantly for Posner’s project, his account of democracy is not pragmatic
at all—even on Posner’s own terms. Moreover, although Dewey’s specific
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 162.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 107-08.
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views of democracy and particular instantiations of Concept 1 democracy
may not ineluctably follow from Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy, this does
not mean that pragmatism is neutral toward whatever concept of democracy
or theory of political governance one might adopt. On the contrary, there is
an organic relation between Dewey’s political views and his philosophy, for
his politics arises from the results of his pragmatic inquiry.
A. The Possibility of Democratic Deliberation
Posner’s justification of Concept 2 democracy begins with a descriptive
argument that Concept 1 is idealistic and unattainable. Posner thinks he is
being pragmatic in his assessment of Concept 1, and uses his descriptive
argument that Concept 1 is unrealistic to buttress his normative choice for
Concept 2. “The big difference is that Concept 2, because of its greater
realism, provides a stronger framework for appraisal of practical
improvements in our democratic system.”174 Posner’s logic is as follows:
Since Concept 2 is realistic, and since it more accurately describes the
status quo than Concept 1, Concept 2 is thus superior. But this logic has
numerous flaws. First, just because Concept 2 is more easily attained or
more reflective of the dominant ideals in the status quo doesn’t make it
more desirable. Second, Posner appears to set up a false dichotomy between
Concept 1 and Concept 2, as if these are the only choices. The pragmatist
would find this quite ironic, since pragmatists, especially Dewey and
James, criticized starting out with overly narrow sets of choices.175 Even if
Concept 1 is in fact unattainable, this does not warrant selecting Concept 2
unless it is the only remaining choice.
Nevertheless, Posner’s critique about the plausibility of Concept 1 does
have important implications. Regardless of the merits of Concept 2, the
unattainability of Concept 1 may be grounds to reject it. On Posner’s
account, “advocates of Concept 1 ask for the moon.”176 And because of this,
most Concept 1 theorists are profoundly disappointed when they discover
that people are not sufficiently civic-minded and politically informed: “The
theorist of deliberative democracy prescribes conditions of knowledge,
attention, and public-spiritedness that the people cannot or will not satisfy
in their political life.”177 In short, Posner’s argument is that the pragmatist is
too sober and realistic to be fooled by the idealistic illusions behind
Concept 1.
174. Id. at 248.
175. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, in THE WILL TO
BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 184, 206-08 (New York, Longmans,
Green & Co. 1897).
176. POSNER, supra note 6, at 188.
177. Id. at 157.
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This argument basically consists of two claims. The first is a claim
about human capacity and potential. People are not (and will never be)
civic-minded in the way Concept 1 proponents want them to be. Second,
Posner argues that democratic deliberation as Concept 1 envisions is
impossible. Posner believes both of these arguments are pragmatic. In our
discussion below we provide an alternative view that challenges this
account. We suggest that conclusions about human capacity are premature
in light of the insufficiency of present efforts to engage individuals and
groups in wide-ranging community debate. We also argue that pragmatic
democracy depends upon such efforts.
1. Human Capacity and Potential
John Dewey observed that all social and political philosophies “involve
a certain view about the constitution of human nature.”178 Posner’s
democratic theory is founded upon a very cynical understanding of human
nature. His view of human nature becomes apparent in his critique of
Concept 1 democrats, whom Posner strongly chastises for being too
idealistic about the capabilities of American citizens to engage in
meaningful public discourse. According to Posner, in reality, “[t]he United
States is a tenaciously philistine society. Its citizens have little appetite for
abstractions and little time and less inclination to devote substantial time to
training themselves to become informed and public-spirited voters.”179
Posner contends that political issues are becoming too complicated and
numerous for the public to understand them.180 Moreover, people are
increasingly apathetic and uninterested in politics: “[E]ven people who
bother to vote often lack much interest in or knowledge of the issues and
candidates.”181 For Posner, most people are selfish and individualistic:
“[M]ost citizens are interested not in what is best in some sense for the
nation or the world but rather in what is best from the standpoint of their
self-interest.”182
Posner claims that most Concept 1 theorists recognize these limitations
on human nature and thus are bound to fall into despair: “Concept 1
democrats are thus in a bind. Realism requires them to prefer representative
to direct democracy. But realism teaches that elected representatives cannot
be depended on to deliberate in the public interest. Realism is Concept 2
democracy.”183
178. DEWEY, supra note 150, at 13, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 19251953, supra note 11, at 72.
179. POSNER, supra note 6, at 164.
180. Id. at 151.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 192-93.
183. Id. at 154.
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This sort of “realism,” however, is not consistent with Posner’s other
statements about pragmatism. Posner notes that pragmatists understand that
all knowledge is local and perspectival. In The Problems of Jurisprudence,
Posner states that he embraces pragmatism because it recognizes the
“‘localness’ of human knowledge” and “the consequent importance of
keeping diverse paths of inquiry open.”184 In The Problematics of Moral
and Legal Theory, Posner notes that “doubt rather than belief is the spur to
inquiry; and doubt is a disposition that pragmatism encourages, precisely in
order to spur inquiry.”185 In Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Posner
claims that pragmatism is antifoundationalist and that “[w]e cannot hope to
know the universe as it really is.”186
If knowledge is local and perspectival, however, then the pragmatist
cannot simply begin uncritically with the “facts.” Posner’s pragmatist is
skeptical about theory, but not about facts. But although Dewey and other
pragmatists argued that philosophy begins with problems in experience, this
does not mean that we should always take these perceived problems at face
value. We must be critical about how we assess the facts of a situation.187
Facts, Dewey observed, “are not self-sufficient and complete in themselves.
They are selected and described . . . for a purpose.”188 The “facts” are
selected based on our interests and in response to particular problems in
experience. What we perceive as a “fact” is related to our purposes.
Posnerian pragmatism is skeptical about theory because it is infused with
ideology, yet facts also deserve scrutiny given the nature of their selection.
When Posner’s realism is applied to human nature, he views human
capabilities as having fixed limitations. For example, Posner writes: “Like
populists, [pragmatists] take people as they find them; anything else would
be unrealistic.”189 He states that “Concept 1 democracy is unworkable. It
hopelessly exaggerates the moral and intellectual capacities, both actual and
potential, not only of the average person but also of the average official
(including judge) and even of the political theorists who seek to tutor the
people and the officials.”190 This leads Posner to conclude that reforms to
increase political deliberation are not feasible.191
Posner’s conception of human nature becomes even more evident when
he writes about Schumpeter’s view that
184. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 465 (1990).
185. POSNER, supra note 28, at 264.
186. POSNER, supra note 6, at 5.
187. See DEWEY, supra note 69, at 31-32, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS,
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 38; DEWEY, supra note 83, at 70-71, reprinted in 12 JOHN DEWEY:
THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 76.
188. DEWEY, supra note 83, at 113, reprinted in 12 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 19251953, supra note 11, at 116.
189. POSNER, supra note 6, at 155.
190. Id. at 144.
191. Id. at 163.
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society is composed of wolves and sheep. The wolves are the
natural leaders. They rise to the top in every society. The challenge
to politics is to provide routes to the top that deflect the wolves
from resorting to violence, usurpation, conquest, and oppression to
obtain their place in the sun.192
Posner goes on to state that “Schumpeter’s theory of democracy is realistic
in its recognition that these people exist, that they will be the rulers
whatever the structure of government.”193 Posner chastises Concept 1
democrats for failing to realize this: “What Plato failed to recognize in
urging that philosophers should be the kings, and what Plato’s descendants
among deliberative democrats fail to recognize in urging government by
discussion, is that a political system that does not enable the natural rulers
to rule cannot survive.”194
The view that everyone in society can be categorized into “wolves” and
“sheep” is remarkably reductive. Posner offers no sociological or empirical
support for this conclusion. It is apparently part of the Posnerian
metaphysics that human beings are inherently one of these two types.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Posnerian pragmatist has taken a strong
position in the nature versus nurture debate, concluding that nature wins all
the time. In Posner’s view, society doesn’t help shape who becomes wolves
or sheep; the wolves are born wolves and the role of society is to treat them
accordingly.
It is far from a truism, however, that a person is simply born a “wolf” or
a “sheep.” Even if one were to employ this dichotomy, one would expect
that which people turn out to be the wolves would depend on the structure
of a given society. Posner talks about “natural leaders,” but this way of
talking implies that there is a particular leadership skill, a view that has
much more in common with the Platonism Posner rejects.195 It seems much
more likely that the skills that contribute to effective leadership in a
particular society will vary greatly with its makeup and history. In fact,
earlier on in the book Posner points out that the skills of a successful judge
are not universal qualities that work in all situations, but rather particular
qualities that work well at a given time and place:
Pragmatists, whose orientation is historicist rather than timeless,
will reject [the] view that the qualities of a good judge are
historically constant. It was the extraordinary fit between [Justice
John] Marshall’s suite of qualities and the volatile historical setting
192. Id. at 183.
193. Id. at 184.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 30 (“The simplest definition of pragmatism is that it is the rejection of
Platonism root and branch.”).
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in which he worked that mainly explains his success and his
greatness.196
Pragmatically, it makes little sense to talk about “natural” leaders. Why
can a society not survive if it fails to allow the “natural rulers” to rule? If
the point is that some are, by nature, fit to rule and some are not, then on
what empirical basis does this conclusion rest? On the surface, this claim
has more of the ring of Plato’s noble lie, which classifies people into three
natural types,197 than of a pragmatic investigation of the consequences of
different social treatment of individuals with particular character traits. If
the point is that some people are so willful and self-interested that they will
derail the larger social structure if not made leaders, then the claim seems
patently false. We have many mechanisms of social control and a wide
variety of rewards and punishments to prevent dissatisfied individuals from
harming society. One would expect Posner as pragmatist to argue instead
that people with different traits would be effective rulers at different times,
depending on the makeup of the society in which they live.
Ironically, Posner seems to place his view of human nature in the
mouths of Concept 1 theorists, whom he views as elitist:
From the perspective of many (of course not all) of the faculty of
those departments, the average voter is ignorant, philistine,
provincial, selfish, excessively materialistic, puritanical (or
libertine—depending on which end of the political spectrum the
faculty member making the judgment occupies), superficial, vulgar,
insensitive, unimaginative, complacent, chauvinistic, superstitious,
uneducable, benighted politically, prone to hysteria, and
overweight.198
Posner writes as if only the Concept 1 democrats are elitist and as if this
charge doesn’t apply to his advocacy for Concept 2. But he seems to
assume as true the vision of the American people he attributes to Concept 1.
Whereas Concept 1 democrats may lament the fact that many voters do not
rise to their ideals, they nevertheless recognize that the voters have the
potential to be civic-minded and intelligent. Posner seems to deny even this.
Posner claims that “Concept 2 is thus more respectful of people as they
actually are.”199 But what are people “actually”? For Dewey, people are not
fixed entities, but a growth process occurring over an entire lifespan.200 The

196. Id. at 92.
197. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 93-94 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 2d ed. 1991).
198. POSNER, supra note 6, at 155-56.
199. Id. at 165-66.
200. DEWEY, supra note 69, at 224-25, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS,
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 210.
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individual, observes Dewey, is not “something complete, perfect, finished,
an organized whole of parts united by the impress of a comprehensive
form,” but is “something moving, changing, discrete, and above all
initiating instead of final.”201 Dewey observes that only certain “innate
needs,” such as those for food and drink are unchangeable.202 And even
these needs are fixed only in the most general sense, for “what kinds of
food are wanted and used are a matter of acquired habit influenced by both
physical environment and social custom.”203 Defenders of the status quo
have often wrongly asserted that social reform is impossible because human
nature cannot be changed. For example, Dewey notes that Aristotle viewed
slaves as having “an inherently slavish nature” and “would have regarded
efforts to abolish slavery from society as an idle and utopian effort to
change human nature where it was unchangeable.”204 Pragmatists like
Dewey are open-minded about human nature, viewing it experimentally, as
something that is growing and changing. Viewing human nature as fixed
“diverts attention from the question of whether or not a change is desirable
and from the other question of how it shall be brought about.”205
While many Americans do not rise up to the ideals of Concept 1
theorists, it is not clear that Posner paints an accurate picture of the
American people. The reality is far more complex. On certain issues, people
may be provincial and selfish, but on others they may be more
civic-minded. Unpragmatically, Posner grounds his conception of human
nature in a set of ipse dixits supported only by his own speculative
judgments and intuitions.206
201. Id. at 177, reprinted in 1 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11,
at 167; see also DEWEY, supra note 87, at 139-40, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE
WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 97.
202. John Dewey, Does Human Nature Change?, 52 ROTARIAN 8, 8 (1938), reprinted in 13
JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 286, 286.
203. Id. at 9, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at
287.
204. Id., reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at
287.
205. Id. at 59, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11,
at 293. As Robin West writes,
The early liberals’ greatest substantive mistake, Dewey charged, was a direct
consequence of this methodological failure to see that their vision of human nature and
their definition of the good life were derived from the historically contingent conditions
against which they perceived the individual as embattled: social and legal restraints on
the alienability of labor, land, and commodities and legal and political inequalities of
status.
Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U.
PITT. L. REV. 673, 696-97 (1985).
206. We are not the first to critique Posner for failing to practice what he preaches. See Linda
E. Fisher, Pragmatism Is as Pragmatism Does: Of Posner, Public Policy, and Empirical Reality,
31 N.M. L. REV. 455, 457-58 (2001) (“[Posner’s] writings repeatedly emphasize the need for
judicial self-restraint, deference to other branches of government, and the prudence of generally
following precedent, but his own judicial practice can exhibit lack of restraint and an unwarranted
arrogation of power. His use of empirical data can be undisciplined, and his opinions sometimes

SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC

2003]

12/8/2003 12:00 PM

Radical Pragmatism

725

To the extent that the American people are apathetic toward political
issues, the pragmatic response is not to view their apathy as an immutable
reality. Political apathy is not an innate quality in human nature but a
product of social institutions. Pragmatists seek to understand the way that
the structure of American political life has influenced how people
participate. Instead of taking the current “reality” as a given, pragmatists
would experiment with different means to enhance the meaningfulness of
political participation. Lack of political engagement may not stem from an
inherent disinterest in politics; it might stem from a lack of avenues for
participating meaningfully in public life. A pragmatic approach would
focus on the future and recognize the need to create conditions for people to
become engaged.207
2. Democratic Deliberation
Beyond his bleak, deterministic, and unpragmatic account of human
nature, Posner also makes another (so-called) pragmatic argument for the
conclusion that Concept 1 is doomed. According to Posner, democratic
deliberation is impossible. He contends that “sober proponents of Concept 1
democracy realize that deliberation is not effective in bridging fundamental
disagreements.”208 Moreover, Posner argues, “debates over moral and
political philosophy are notoriously inconclusive—I would go further and
call them indeterminate and interminable—and in any event far above the
head of the average, or for that matter the above-average, voter.”209
Therefore, Posner concludes, “[o]nly intellectuals believe . . . that
discussion can resolve deep political or ideological conflicts.”210
Why can’t people engage in meaningful dialogue? One reason, Posner
posits, is religion: “Since so many Americans . . . are religious, and
religious belief is a showstopper so far as public debate in our society is
concerned, it is doubtful that deliberation over fundamental political goals
and values is feasible outside our leading universities, the ethos of which is
secular.”211 But this conclusion is not obvious. Many individuals with deep
range well beyond the issues that are before the court.”); Ravitch, supra note 28, at 974-75
(critiquing Posner for failing to carefully analyze data and basing his analysis on unanalyzed
assumptions); Rosen, supra note 28, at 601 (noting that Posner’s pragmatism is unpragmatic).
207. For example, the work of Paul Schwartz examines how “cyberspace has a tremendous
potential to revitalize democratic self-governance at a time when a declining level of participation
in communal life endangers civil society in the United States.” Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1610-11 (1999). Schwartz argues that the
realization of the democratic potential of the Internet depends in part on the protection of privacy
online. Schwartz’s work thus provides an example of a future-oriented focus on the ways in which
we can guide new technologies in enhancing self-government.
208. POSNER, supra note 6, at 135.
209. Id. at 133.
210. Id. at 138.
211. Id. at 137.
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religious commitments participate in political debates (e.g., Martin Luther
King, Jr.). Just because people are religious does not mean that they will be
unable to find common ground with others for the purposes of many
political discussions.212 Moreover, the use of religious arguments in
political debates does not automatically serve as a “showstopper”—only
certain kinds of intolerant fundamentalist religious arguments are anathema
to public discourse.213
Posner’s central attack on democratic deliberation is based on a strong
skepticism, which Posner claims is pragmatic. People have different
positions, and there is no way to privilege one view over another, since
doing so would assume some theory of objective truth, which, as Posner
claims, the pragmatist rejects. Therefore, Posner concludes, not much
meaningful deliberation can occur, and theory can do little useful work. The
Posnerian pragmatist is a skeptic who doubts “that anyone has a handle on
the really big truths, especially those of a moral, religious, or political
cast.”214 As a result, “pragmatists are inclined to throw up their hands and
say, let the people decide such matters because there are no trustworthy
experts on them.”215 “The problem of democracy, as of government
generally, is to manage conflict among persons who, often arguing from
incompatible premises, cannot overcome their differences by discussion.”216
Therefore, Posner argues, democracy ends in a vote, which “is the
antithesis of deliberation and the mark of its failure.”217 “Voting in a sense
marks the failure of deliberative democracy, the failure to have achieved
consensus through deliberation.”218 Posner contends that “the Concept 2
democrat applauds the use of voting to resolve political disagreements
because it is quick and nearly costless and because the most serious of those
disagreements cannot be resolved by discussion anyway.”219 Voting is
inevitable in a democracy, Posner believes, because discourse and
deliberation don’t (and can’t) really function. “But in a morally
heterogeneous nation like the United States, many issues can be resolved
212. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
213. As Jürgen Habermas argues,
While religious toleration is basic to a democratic constitutional state, in this way
religious consciousness itself undergoes a learning process. With the introduction of a
right to freedom of religious expression, all religious communities must adopt the
constitutional principle of the equal inclusion of everyone. They cannot merely benefit
from the toleration of the others, but must themselves face up to the generalized
expectation of tolerance, with all the consequences this entails.
Jürgen Habermas, Intolerance and Discrimination, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 2, 6 (2003).
214. POSNER, supra note 6, at 105.
215. Id. at 105-06.
216. Id. at 112.
217. Id. at 187.
218. Id. at 222.
219. Id. at 223.
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only by the force surrogate that is majority vote.”220 Therefore, democracy
for Posner is a “‘competitive struggle for the people’s vote and not
discussion and decision among the people themselves.’”221 Democracy
through voting is simply another means by which the powerful get
their way, a nonviolent instantiation of might makes right. This is a very
bleak vision. With democracy, we have just found a surrogate to avoid
violence—nothing more.
To be successful for Posner, debate apparently must result in total
consensus and complete resolution of an issue. Since he believes that such
resolution is impossible, debate must be endless, and any ending is thus a
failure and abandonment of the discussion. Posner is wrong to assume that
all deliberation must end in a decision. As Dewey observed, “All
deliberation is a search for a way to act, not for a final terminus.”222 Voting
is often not the end of debate. It is just a decision being made despite
continuing disagreement and dialogue.
Just because issues and elections are decided by a vote and everybody
is not in agreement does not mean that deliberation and discussion play no
role or have somehow failed. Posner demands too much from deliberation,
and he creates a caricature of what Concept 1 democrats hope deliberation
can achieve. Despite its flaws, political discourse is hardly dead in America.
People do discuss and debate politics. Deliberation does influence how
people vote. People change their minds based on discussions they have with
others. Public debate often forces individuals to explain inconsistency or
accept the consequences of their commitments. Ideas do percolate and
spread throughout society. While these conversations may not always rise
to a grand level of sophistication, they certainly occur.
Pragmatism makes a radical break with philosophers who assume, like
Kant, that practical ends must be generated by pure reason. It also diverges
from theorists like Posner who, unable to embrace a Kantian theoretical
project, forego theoretical criticism altogether and thereby privilege present
dominant ideologies. As William James observed, pragmatism stands
between the “tough-minded” and the “tender-minded.”223 Tough-minded
empiricists focus on “facts in all their crude variety,” whereas tenderminded rationalists focus on “abstract and eternal principles.”224 For James,
pragmatism is a way to combine “willingness to take account of [facts]”
with “intellectual abstraction.”225

220. Id. at 138.
221. Id. at 178 (quoting ALBERT WEALE, DEMOCRACY 98 (1999)).
222. DEWEY, supra note 87, at 193, reprinted in 14 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS,
1899-1924, supra note 72, at 134.
223. JAMES, supra note 59, at 12.
224. Id. at 9.
225. Id. at 20.
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As explained by James, the tough-minded are best described as
“materialistic,” “pessimistic,” “sceptical,” and “going by ‘facts,’”226 many
of Posner’s defining traits. Like the tough-minded empiricist, Posner rejects
any role for philosophical theory. From a Deweyan perspective, Posner’s
brand of empiricism views the world as “already constructed and
determined.”227 “An empiricism which is content with repeating facts
already past,” wrote Dewey, “has no place for possibility and for liberty.”228
We are what we are, Posner seems to be telling us, and we should not only
accept this, but embrace it. The pragmatist would almost surely disagree.
More often than not, immediate and unquestioning surrender is the least
pragmatic approach.
Posner wrongly believes that deliberation must lead to consensus in
order to have value. But deliberation furthers important values even when it
does not produce consensus. For one thing, there is value in clarifying the
conflict, not just in resolving it.229 Second, to the degree that we fail to
recognize the divergence of viewpoints in our community, we are
handicapped in our attempts to bridge the gaps. The failure to understand
different perspectives can lead to hasty solutions based on inadequate
descriptions of the problem. Third, in many contexts, individuals are at least
as concerned with being heard as they are with instantiating their view of
the “right answer.”
B. Problems with Concept 2 Democracy
In addition to arguing that Concept 1 democracy is not attainable,
Posner also makes a more affirmative case for his claim that Concept 2 is
“normatively superior.”230 Posner notes that “Concept 2 democrats often
find redeeming value in features of American democracy that Concept 1
democrats deplore.”231 But Posner’s Concept 2 democracy is not obviously
pragmatic.
Posner is emphatic in his praise for Concept 2, which he grounds in his
pragmatism. He proclaims that ours is the “most successful political system
since the Roman Empire!”232 But what are the normative criteria for
226. Id. at 12.
227. John Dewey, The Development of American Pragmatism, in 2 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY
OF IDEAS 353, 365 (Dep’t of Philosophy of Columbia Univ. ed., 1925), reprinted in 2 JOHN
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 3, 12-13.
228. Id., reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 12.
229. See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE 133 (1998) (“We can try to use the beliefs of
others as a partial check on our own. When we do this, our goal is not necessarily to reach
agreement with others; rather, it is to use the project of explaining disagreement as a means of
broadening our understanding of the social world.”).
230. POSNER, supra note 6, at 130.
231. Id. at 171.
232. Id. at 182.
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success? One could say glibly that Concept 2 democracy is better because it
works, but whether Concept 2 “works” depends upon the normative goals
we have, which in turn depend upon a theory of the good. One could also
contend that Concept 2 democracy is better because it is more efficient, but
again, since “efficiency” can only be evaluated in light of ends one wants to
achieve, those ends are precisely the question at stake. Without knowing
what one’s ends are, one cannot evaluate whether a social structure is
efficient in achieving them. What are the ends that democracy should
achieve? This brings us back again to the need for a theory of the good.
So what is Posner’s theory of the good? Posner doesn’t tell us
explicitly. Instead of a theory of the good, Posner offers a number of goals
he believes democracy should achieve. He believes democracy should:
(1) cost “very little . . . in time, money, and distraction from private
pursuits commercial or otherwise”;
(2) allow people to “punish at least the flagrant mistakes and
misfeasances of officialdom”;
(3) “assure an orderly succession of at least minimally competent
officials”;
(4) “generate feedback to the officials concerning the consequences
of their policies”;
(5) “prevent officials from (or punish them for) entirely ignoring
the interests of the governed”;
(6) “prevent serious misalignments between government action and
public opinion”; and
(7) avoid “placing electoral minorities at substantial risk of having
their property rights or other liberties curtailed by the democratic
majority.”233
Posner does not offer an extensive justification of this vision of
democracy, although it is hard to argue with these goals, since they are
taken for granted in most formulations of democracy. What democratic
theory wouldn’t prevent officials from “entirely ignoring the interests of the
governed”?234
Yet this is a remarkably thin set of goals for a working democracy. In
fact, Posner’s normative ends for democracy can be boiled down to two

233. Id.
234. Id. (emphasis added).
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goals: (1) promoting freedom for people to pursue their private interests,
and (2) promoting political stability. Since Posner views Americans as
essentially selfish atomistic individuals who just want to be left alone and
not be bothered by politics, the point of a democratic system is to prevent
obstacles from getting in their way. Indeed, the overarching concern that
ties together the majority of the goals Posner lists is a commitment to
stability, the keys to which involve ensuring the orderly succession of
officials and allowing for minimal checks when the officials really get out
of hand (punishing “flagrant mistakes” or “entirely ignoring” the public
interest, and preventing gross disparities between the government and
public opinion). Furthermore, Posner wants to protect against the tyranny of
the majority, and one suspects he has in mind the instability that might be
created when the majority wants to encroach on the property rights of the
wealthy elite minority. Posner also argues that “Concept 2 democrats also
don’t lose sleep over the possibility that an election might be won by a
candidate who got fewer votes than his competitor, provided the margin is
small. They worry more about deadlocked elections that produce delay or
make Presidential succession uncertain.”235 In the good Posnerian society,
stability is a central value.
It will not surprise readers familiar with Posner’s longstanding support
for markets that the goals of freedom to pursue private interests and
stability are also important preconditions to a free market. In fact, when the
smoke clears, it is a particular conception of the free market, and not
democracy, that Posner seems most interested in fostering. Throughout the
book, Posner extols the virtues of markets over political life: “Commercial
activity and private life are not only more productive of wealth and
happiness than the political life; they are also more peaceable, which in turn
reinforces their positive effect on wealth and happiness.”236 Politics “is
often a zero-sum or even a negative-sum game. Economic competition is
more likely to be a positive-sum game.”237 On Posner’s account, political
life is nasty and brutish and disruptive, akin to a kind of war, whereas
market activity is constructive and encourages civil relations.
But is market activity really better than political life? Posner writes:
“Markets are a means of enabling potentially antipathetic strangers to
transact peaceably with one other; and a superficial relationship, in which
all the deep issues are bracketed, is the most productive basis on which to
deal with strangers.”238 What kind of society would we be if all our
interactions were like this? For many, the good life consists of more than
having “superficial” relationships with others in society. It consists of
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 172.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 31.
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discussing and debating the “deep issues.” For Posner, only the intellectual
elites can enjoy this type of deeper existence. But it is far from true that
people generally don’t enjoy political discussions or any sort of political
participation.
Moreover, market activity can be nasty and disruptive. Many political
decisions concern the regulation of market activity, for the market left alone
can result in malfeasance and failures. Reining in commerce is a divisive
issue in political life. The shape of the market itself cannot be resolved
without recourse to politics.239 Therefore, Posner is wrong to assume a
dichotomy between commercial and political life, viewing the market as
some sort of insular paradise when, in fact, it is always already deeply
infused with politics.
C. Dewey, Pragmatism, and Democracy
1. The Illusion of Neutrality
Posner has stated time and again that pragmatism has “no inherent
political valence.”240 Posner is not alone in this conclusion. According to
Richard Rorty, pragmatism “is neutral between alternative prophecies, and
thus neutral between democrats and fascists.”241 Since pragmatism on this
account has no political valence, Posner argues that there is no connection
between the pragmatic ideas of John Dewey and his political philosophy:
“The connection between the liberal-visionary and the pragmatic is purely
historical and contingent. It happens that John Dewey and some other
pragmatist philosophers were also left-leaning political visionaries.”242
Posner’s contention that Dewey’s political views “have no organic relation
to his philosophy”243 is a necessary step in his justification of Concept 2
democracy, for he takes many of Dewey’s basic pragmatic ideas but desires
to use them to support a very different vision of democracy than Dewey,
who was a Concept 1 democrat.
If Posner is correct in his claim that pragmatism has no political
valence, then it is puzzling how he can claim that Concept 2 democracy is
the “democracy of the pragmatists.”244 It is difficult to imagine how an
239. See THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, THE INGENUITY GAP 244-45 (2000) (“The relationship
between government and the market is decidedly symbiotic. . . . Even in the most laissez-faire
capitalist economies, markets float on a sea of complex institutions, regulations, and government
interventions.”).
240. POSNER, supra note 6, at 84; POSNER, supra note 19, at 393.
241. Richard Rorty, The Professor and the Prophet, 52 TRANSITION 70, 75 (1991) (reviewing
CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM
(1989)).
242. POSNER, supra note 6, at 46.
243. Id. at 98.
244. Id. at 143.
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inherently apolitical pragmatic method can be linked to one theory of
democracy over another. Posner thus must resort to a variety of
unpragmatic contortions to free himself from this logical bind. We have
argued that Posner’s justification for Concept 2 democracy rests upon
dubious foundations that resemble the type of reasoning pragmatism rejects.
Although Posner contends that there is no connection between
Deweyan democratic theory and pragmatism, he is mistaken. Of course,
pragmatists have reached very different, sometimes mutually exclusive,
political views. But the fact that pragmatists can arrive at different political
conclusions does not imply that pragmatism is completely neutral as to
which conclusions one might reach.
Pragmatism refuses to accept on face value claims about methods being
“neutral.” Rather, pragmatism recognizes that our critical investigations are
infused with value commitments. No neutral determination is possible.
Under this account, the point of philosophy is less a matter of securing
objective truth and more a matter of facilitating effective growth in the face
of particular problems. Pragmatism is not a method purified of experience.
Pragmatism does not start out from some Archimedean point; it begins with
commitments, which have certain valences. Pragmatism asks particular
kinds of questions and suggests we abandon other types of questions. As
Dewey argued,
[T]he conviction persists—though history shows it to be a
hallucination—that all the questions that the human mind has asked
are questions that can be answered in terms of the alternatives that
the questions themselves present. But in fact intellectual progress
usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together
with both of the alternatives they assume—an abandonment that
results from their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent
interest. We do not solve them: we get over them.245
Since all questions guide the focus of our intellectual attention, they lead us
in particular directions.
For Dewey, pragmatism is not simply a tool external to democracy, and
it would be a mistake to use pragmatism to determine the ideal democratic
structure. This is not the type of question pragmatism suggests we
investigate. For the pragmatist, there is no ideal democratic structure;
245. JOHN DEWEY, The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy, in THE INFLUENCE OF
DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT, supra note 11, at 1,
19, reprinted in 4 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE WORKS, 1899-1924, supra note 72, at 3, 14.
Richard Rorty follows this strategy. See RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM, at
xiv (1982) (“So pragmatists see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. This does
not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to Platonic questions to offer, but
rather that they do not think we should ask those questions anymore. . . . They would simply like
to change the subject.”).
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rather, a democracy is a process whereby a community continually seeks to
define itself as it moves into the future. A democracy is therefore not static,
but continually evolving. Moreover, democracy is more than just a set of
political structures; it is a way of making certain decisions about the future
of the community. Dewey believed that democratic decisionmaking should
be pragmatic. Pragmatists certainly agree that pragmatism is a more
productive method of engaging our problems than other methods. Even
Posner makes this argument, for his book is endorsing pragmatism, not
merely describing it. To the extent that pragmatism is successful in this
way, then not only individuals, but also entire communities, should engage
in pragmatic inquiry. Democracy thus should consist of pragmatic inquiry
at a community-wide level. Under this view, pragmatic democracy is, like
pragmatism, a commitment to a form of inquiry—the endorsement of
experimental method on the social and political stage.
For Dewey, democracy is “a way of life, social and individual.”246 John
Stuhr explains Dewey’s conception of democracy as “a form of life rather
than a form of government alone.”247 Democratic government is “a means
for realizing democratic ends in individual lives and social relationships.”248
Under this view, democracy does not primarily consist of institutions or
government structures: “Democracy exists only on paper and in statute
unless individuals enact it in their own transactions day by day and face-toface in local communities. That is, a society of individuals can become a
democracy only as those individuals act democratically.”249 As Dewey
observed, “[D]emocracy is much broader than a special political form, a
method of conducting government, of making laws and carrying on
governmental administration by means of popular suffrage and elected
officers.”250
Thus, even if our government has a democratic structure, we are not
democratic unless we live our lives democratically. This injunction has
consequences for the way we approach our democratic inheritance. We
should not see democracy as something that has been accomplished simply
by the choice of an appropriate set of representative governmental
structures that can be passed down from generation to generation. Instead,
the meaning of democracy must change continually with changes in lives

246. John Dewey, Democracy and Educational Administration (Feb. 22, 1937), in AM.
ASSOC. OF SCH. ADM’RS, NAT’L EDUC. ASSOC., OFFICIAL REPORT: NEW ORLEANS CONVENTION
48, 49 (1937), reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at
217, 217.
247. JOHN J. STUHR, PRAGMATISM, POSTMODERNISM, AND THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY 51
(2003).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 64.
250. Dewey, supra note 246, at 49, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 19251953, supra note 11, at 217.

SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC

734

12/8/2003 12:00 PM

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 113: 687

“and cultural conditions,”251 and this reconstruction is democratic only to
the extent means are found to fully involve all members of the community
in this reconstruction.
While Posner’s thin account of pragmatism seems insufficient for
generating substantive ends, a thicker account of pragmatism recommends
that a community pragmatically reconstruct its ends.252 On this thicker
account, democracy and pragmatism go hand in hand. As Hilary Putnam
observes, for Dewey democracy is “not just a form of social life among
other workable forms of social life; it is the precondition for the full
application of intelligence to the solution of social problems.”253 Certain
characteristics of democracy facilitate the community’s engaging in
pragmatic inquiry about the future shape of its democracy. Pragmatic
inquiry enables a community to make itself more democratic. Pragmatism
and democracy are thus mutually reinforcing.
2. Pragmatism’s Valences
The account of Deweyan pragmatism we sketched in Part I recognizes
that pragmatism is not neutral. Of course, this account of pragmatism does
not imply a specific theory of political philosophy. But it does have
valences. In order to ask what political future pragmatism recommends, we
must also ask in what political culture pragmatic forms of inquiry about the
political future can best be carried out. The answer to this latter question
leads us in the direction of what we call a “general democratic culture.”
First, as discussed in Part I, pragmatism subjects existing institutions
and the status quo to ongoing critique, since it recommends that we
critically examine our ends. When one commits oneself to a thorough use
of pragmatic method, certain conclusions are ruled out in advance, such as a
politics informed by supernatural or transcendental ideals, or a politics that
arbitrarily excludes particular viewpoints. Supernaturalism and absolutism
conflict with the general approach of the pragmatic method, which is to
subject our ideals, ends, and conclusions to the test of experience. Indeed, it
is this commitment that in part motivates Posner’s rejection of
philosophical theory, for much philosophical theory has traditionally
harbored ideological commitments that were then foisted upon the unaware
from the altar of theory. But the fear of ideology can lead to cures that are
worse than the disease. Although Posner claims to adhere to a neutral

251. STUHR, supra note 247, at 72.
252. For a discussion of the method that such pragmatic reconstruction might take, see JAMES
CAMPBELL, THE COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTS: THE MEANING OF PRAGMATIC SOCIAL THOUGHT
38-58 (1992).
253. Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671,
1671 (1990).

SULLIVANSOLOVEFINAL4.DOC

2003]

12/8/2003 12:00 PM

Radical Pragmatism

735

pragmatic method without political valences, the results of his application
of this method are deeply ensconced in ideology. Posner’s pragmatism does
have a particular political valence—one that favors the dominant ends of
the status quo. The result is that while Posnerian pragmatism rejects
supernaturalism and absolutism, it starts with an unquestioning acceptance
of current institutions. Ironically, it winds up in a similar posture to
supernaturalism and absolutism, for in each of these instances certain issues
are insulated from critical scrutiny.
Second, under Deweyan pragmatism, democracy depends upon
deliberation. Democratic deliberation is the way we establish shared
meanings and determine the ends of a community. It is important to
distinguish between individual and community ends. Individuals can
readily choose their own ends, but for communities, the task is more
difficult. This is because a community’s ends depend on the identity of the
community, which must be ascertained by examining the history of that
community and soliciting input from across the community as a whole.
Examining community identity leads us to ask: Who are we becoming?
How are we growing? Do we want to continue in this fashion? Who do we
want to become? There is no movement into the future that does not
presuppose a judgment about the past and present. Pragmatists therefore
need to encourage public deliberation about our identity since there is no
way to determine what is better or worse without reference to that identity.
Since community rather than individual ends are at issue, dialogue
becomes essential. Community ends are determined collectively, and doing
so requires communication. This dialogue does not need to be an
academically sophisticated discourse; rather, pragmatism merely requires
that people participate in a discussion of the meaning of ends understood in
the context of present circumstances. These are philosophical discussions
not because they take place in universities, but because they ask about the
good life under present social conditions. A pragmatic approach to
democracy is one that understands itself as part of existing political
conversations about the nature and ends of the community.
Third, since experience is social and meanings are constituted through
communication, efforts to describe experience and formulate an account of
social problems must seek contributions from a wide range of participants
in social experience. As William Caspary observes, “Dewey is, above all, a
participatory democracy theorist.”254 According to Dewey, a citizen must
have “a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the
activities of the groups to which [she] belongs.”255 Under Dewey’s theory,

254. WILLIAM R. CASPARY, DEWEY ON DEMOCRACY 8 (2000).
255. DEWEY, supra note 98, at 147, reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 19251953, supra note 11, at 327.
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participation is a highly valued end.256 For Posner, in contrast, participation
has no value unless it can achieve results that benefit one’s self-interest.
Beyond being valuable in and of itself, participation is valuable
instrumentally as well. According to Dewey, self-government “is
educative,” for it “forces a recognition that there are common interests.”257
Thus, the purpose of democracy is not to take the people as they are. The
value of democratic participation is to educate people, to enable them to
realize common interests and see themselves as part of a community.
Dewey’s experimental method does not simply consist of presenting
hypotheses; rather, it requires testing proposals to resolve present problems
by seeing how they work in experience. Interpreting the social meaning of a
particular set of experiments requires recourse to the larger community. As
Posner himself notes, different individuals’ experiences lead them to
approach problems in different ways, and some approaches work better
than others for particular problems.258 Accordingly, we increase our
chances of finding effective solutions to social problems by looking to a
broad range of contributors.
Therefore, in contrast to Posnerian pragmatism, the account of
pragmatism we offer openly acknowledges that it is not completely neutral.
Although pragmatism does not point to precise resolutions for our debates,
it does send us in a particular direction based on the types of questions it
recommends we investigate. It puts on the table for debate a wide range of
issues, especially the identity of a community and its ends. It requires
dialogue, for the task of determining a community’s ends cannot be
achieved without communication. And it relies on the participation of the
community, not merely upon a group of elites who impose their own ends
upon the community.
Since democracy depends upon the widespread participation of a
community in a dialogue over its ends, the pragmatist pays special attention
to questions concerning the conditions for effective community discussion.
Posner rejects such questions as hopeless and doomed because it is not
realistic to achieve complete community engagement. But these are
precisely the ways in which a community pragmatically resolves the more
specific political arrangements it shall adopt. Because this account of

256. In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey observes:
Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all
singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to
effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared
by all, there is in so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all
its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy.
Id. at 149, reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 328.
257. Id. at 207, reprinted in 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11,
at 364.
258. POSNER, supra note 6, at 101-02.
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pragmatism suggests that we engage in a critical examination of the
dominant ends of society, and that we must do so through dialogue and
through broad community participation, it points us more toward Concept 1
democracy than Concept 2. This does not foreclose us from embracing
some features of Concept 2, but it certainly rejects the insular nature of
Concept 2, which leaves too few avenues for dialogue and community
engagement.
One might object that this account of pragmatism and its relationship to
democracy is circular, as the community’s project of shaping its democracy
depends, in part, on the existence of a general democratic culture. Despite
the circularity, the circle is not vicious. The general democratic culture
required is quite broad and does not come close to the level of specificity
required in the project of determining what particular form a democracy
shall take. But the general democratic culture, as we have defined it, is not
independent of the more particular forms of democracy that the community
adopts. Indeed, the community’s specific democratic arrangements shape its
general democratic culture. How, then, can a community with political
arrangements that do not facilitate a general democratic culture ever
transform itself through pragmatic inquiry into a more robust democracy?
The answer is that a democracy need not be perfect (or even close to
perfect) to engage in pragmatic inquiry. Certainly there have been many
democracies that have not begun democratically; this did not mean that they
were doomed. Dewey’s pragmatic method counsels us constantly to remake
our democracy; we do not just pass it along like a dead object. The key
point is for a community to keep attempting to engage in democratic
pragmatic inquiry and to think of ways to help facilitate it. Such a
democracy is achieved not by establishing an ideal political structure, but
through the sustained incremental development of the capacities of citizens
for developing shared values. Democracy, on this view, is akin to an
activity that one improves through practice. Democracy is something that a
community does, not merely a particular set of rules and structures.
3. Toward a Thicker Account of Democracy
Although our account of pragmatism points us toward certain broad
features of Concept 1, more work is necessary to develop thicker accounts
of democracy. In other words, while the pragmatic method has substantive
valences, it does not dictate the specific contours of a democratic theory. It
points us in a general direction. Commitment to pragmatic method does not
entail, prima facie and in advance of application, a commitment to a
particular politics or narrow conception of democracy. On the contrary,
these conceptions are what one discovers and constructs through such
investigation. Central to Dewey’s pragmatism is a commitment to inquiry
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into one’s present social and cultural conditions. Empirical inquiry does not
form its conclusions in advance of experience.
Therefore, Posner is partially correct when he claims that Dewey’s
politics was “historical and contingent.”259 Indeed, Dewey’s politics was the
result of his best efforts to inquire into the problems of the times and
formulate proposals to ameliorate them. Naturally, Dewey’s political
conclusions bear a historical relationship to the problems of Dewey’s day.
But this fact does not support Posner’s conclusion that Dewey’s politics
bears no “organic relationship” to Dewey’s pragmatism.
Regardless of whether Dewey’s specific policy recommendations were
the most productive responses to the problems he examined, the important
point is that pragmatism recommends a certain kind of discussion. It
requires considering the competing views of our history and explaining why
some views should be seen as superior. Whether or not there is an “organic
relationship” between the application of pragmatic method and the
development of a particular politics is not a matter of drawing out the
logical entailments of pragmatic method. Instead, it is a matter of assessing
the historical record of the actual application of that method in attempts to
respond to a given set of problems.
Pragmatic democratic inquiry would lead us to ask: What are the
pressing problems of the day? What are the relevant community ends?
What means can we use to achieve these ends? The inquiry would also go
deeper to ask: To what extent are the community ends contested? What is
the pedigree of the prevailing community ends? How did these ends
become the prevailing ones? For what purposes were these ends originally
adopted? Do the reasons these ends were adopted still have currency today?
To the extent that there are competing accounts of a community’s ends, can
common ground be discovered?
The pragmatist would also recognize that answering these questions
pragmatically at the community level requires certain features of a
democratic culture—ones that may need significant improvement. The
quality of our pragmatic inquiry into the above questions depends upon the
quality of our democratic culture. To improve that culture, the pragmatist
would explore ways to improve public deliberation and civic participation.
For example, the pragmatist would look to improving education, which
enables individuals to assess experience critically and share their
assessments with others. The pragmatist might also examine how to
promote new means of communication to enable democratic discussions to
take place.260

259. Id. at 46.
260. For a provocative discussion of the resources and challenges of this project in the age of
the Internet, see CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 191-202 (2001).
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One might object that such projects are not pragmatic because they are
often engineered by elites. Deweyan democracy, however, need not be
antagonistic to elites so long as elites see their role as guiding and advising
the public rather than running the show with minimal public
involvement.261 Thus, intellectuals must avoid engaging in isolated
conversations with each other and attempt to engage in more inclusive
public debates.
Posner would also respond that these projects are too utopian because
too many people do not want to participate and are not educated enough to
do anything but vote. But as discussed earlier in this Part, the pragmatist
does not simply accept human nature as given. Democracy, for Dewey, is
about the “maturing and fruition of the potentialities of human nature.”262
Dewey’s view of human nature is inspired in part by Darwin, for Dewey
recognizes that people constantly adjust and adapt to their environments.263
Pragmatists consciously grapple with the challenge of developing human
potential rather than allowing it to remain adrift.
Dewey’s response is that institutions must be changed; further
experimentation is needed in order to help enable society to become more
democratic. In this way, Dewey was idealistic about democracy. He
believed that a commitment to democracy makes “claims upon our future
conduct” and therefore it “is an ideal.”264 Dewey would not view the charge
that Concept 1 is idealistic as troubling at all; he would say that this is
precisely the point of democracy. As Stuhr puts it,
[A]s an ideal, democracy is not simply “unreal.” As an ideal, it is—
or may be or may become—a deep commitment, grasped by
imagination, that draws lives together, makes meaningful our
efforts, and directs our actions. As an ideal, it is generated through
imagination, but it is not “made out of imaginary stuff.” . . .
To describe democratic life as an ideal . . . is not so much to
state a present fact as it is to recommend a future course of action,
an admittedly radical course of action.265

261. See BRUCE KUKLICK, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 1720-2000, at 190
(2001) (noting that for Dewey, “the role of experts was to gain knowledge, but the public had to
determine the problems to be investigated”).
262. DEWEY, supra note 150, at 125, reprinted in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS,
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 152.
263. See JAMES CAMPBELL, UNDERSTANDING JOHN DEWEY 37-38 (1995). Posner repeatedly
discusses the influence of Darwin on pragmatism. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 4-5, 10, 31-32.
264. STUHR, supra note 247, at 55.
265. Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The normative goal of democracy for Dewey was the realization of
people’s full capacities.266 For Dewey, then, unlike Posner, one cannot
simply take human beings and social institutions as one finds them:
The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of
human nature; faith in human intelligence, and in the power of
pooled and cooperative experience. It is not belief that these things
are complete but that if given a show they will grow and be able to
generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide
collective action.267
In the end, Dewey was committed to using the power of intelligence to
bring about a better society capable of facilitating the growth of individuals.
He was convinced that the form and commitment to inquiry that had so
decisively enabled us to increase our control over nature in the realm of
science and technology might also be used to improve the political
governance of society. But he knew that assessment of this claim would
have to await the results of trying to put it into practice. From Dewey’s
point of view, it was far too early to pronounce pragmatic attempts at
reconstruction as failures or successes, because by and large they simply
had not been tried. This remains true today. Even as Posner recommends
our realistic acquiescence to the status quo, his claims that aspirations for a
more deliberative society are too utopian seem driven more by his
affirmation of the present than by any demonstration that improvement is
not possible.
CONCLUSION
In Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Posner has set out his most
thorough account of legal pragmatism to date. Posner views ideals as
useless and philosophical theorizing as empty. Lacking any meaningful
approach for scrutinizing social goals, pragmatism thus devolves into an
efficiency exercise. The task of the pragmatist becomes merely finding the
appropriate means to achieve our given ends. While this search for means
may take a critical form, Posner’s account has little to say about the
selection of ends. Accordingly, his attack on abstract ideals becomes, in
effect, an endorsement of such ideals, since it leaves unreconstructed the
dominant moral ideals of present society.

266. DEWEY, supra note 147, at 56-57, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS,
1925-1953, supra note 11, at 41.
267. Dewey, supra note 246, at 50, reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 19251953, supra note 11, at 219.
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It is not surprising, therefore, that in his theory of democracy, Posner is
not interested in promoting methods for the community to develop shared
ideals. Rather, the pressing need is for a set of elite managers to serve as
efficiency experts, whose goal is to find the most efficient means to achieve
our inherited ends. Posner’s view has significant consequences for thinking
about the nature of democratic community. Since people are not
encouraged to make any effort to form a community on the basis of shared
ideals, the dominant normative ideals of society are left to drift
haphazardly. Society becomes little more than the collective actions of
atomistic individuals. Thus, as with the market, Posner views the
equilibrium that emerges from individuals who pursue their own private
interests as sufficient to generate the larger social ethos.
Posner’s pragmatism, having eschewed attempts to evaluate ends
critically and having effectively pronounced its agnosticism about
community ends, leads naturally to a vision of democracy as principally an
efficient mechanism for dispute resolution. This vision of democracy is
conservative not only because it privileges the inherited demands of the
present, but even more because it rules out as misguided the projects of
reconstructing community identity through public deliberation. In contrast,
the pragmatism of the early pragmatists, especially Dewey, encourages us
to approach our present problems more radically. We should subject both
means and ends to critical inquiry and empower communities to engage in
self-formation by reconstructing the settled habits and ideals that constitute
the status quo. For Dewey, “The end of democracy is a radical end. For it is
an end that has not been adequately realized in any country at any time. It is
radical because it requires great change in existing social institutions,
economic, legal and cultural.”268
Posner is right in his general view that pragmatism has much to offer to
law, as well as to democracy. Its contribution, however, is not a rejection of
philosophical theory but a transformation of how we relate theory to
practice. Far from being banal or timorous, far from accepting our current
practices and institutions as given realities, pragmatism subjects them to
criticism and reconstruction. Unfortunately, Dewey’s provocative
suggestions for reconstruction were never fully developed with respect to
jurisprudence. We hope that increasing interest in legal pragmatism will
facilitate this worthwhile experiment.

268. John Dewey, Democracy Is Radical, COMMON SENSE, Jan. 1937, at 10, 11, reprinted in
11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, supra note 11, at 296, 298-99 (emphasis
omitted).

